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Book Reviews
Editor’s Note: Guidelines for Selecting Books to Review
 Occasionally, we receive questions regarding the selection of books reviewed in the Journal of 
Economic Literature. A statement of our guidelines for book selection might therefore be useful.
 The general purpose of our book reviews is to help keep members of the American Economic 
Association informed of significant English-language publications in economics research. We also 
review significant books in related social sciences that might be of special interest to economists. On 
occasion, we review books that are written for the public at large if these books speak to issues that 
are of interest to economists. Finally, we review some reports or publications that have significant 
policy impact. Annotations are published for all books received. However, we receive many more 
books than we are able to review so choices must be made in selecting books for review.
 We try to identify for review scholarly, well-researched books that embody serious and original 
research on a particular topic. We do not review textbooks. Other things being equal, we avoid 
volumes of collected papers such as festschriften and conference volumes. Often such volumes 
pose difficult problems for the reviewer who may find herself having to describe and evaluate 
many different contributions. Among such volumes, we prefer those on a single, well-defined 
theme that a typical reviewer may develop in his review.
 We avoid volumes that collect previously published papers unless there is some material value 
added from bringing the papers together. Also, we refrain from reviewing second or revised editions 
unless the revisions of the original edition are really substantial.
 Our policy is not to accept offers to review (and unsolicited reviews of) particular books. 
Coauthorship of reviews is not forbidden but it is unusual and we ask our invited reviewers to discuss 
with us first any changes in the authorship or assigned length of a review.
Journal of Economic Literature 2014, 52(4), 1160–1196
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.4.1160
A General Economics and Teaching
Mechanism and Causality in Biology and 
Economics. Edited by Hsiang-Ke Chao, Szu-
Ting Chen, and Roberta L. Millstein. History, 
Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 
vol. 3. New York and Heidelberg: Springer, 
2013. Pp. x, 256. ISBN 978–94–007–2453–2. 
 JEL 2013–0962
The volume under review collects the papers 
given at a 2011 conference, held in Taiwan, on 
philosophical issues arising in economics and 
biology. The focus on economics and biology is 
a welcome change from the usual practice in 
philosophical investigations, which is to base 
discussions of causation on the physical sciences 
or analysis of household appliances. The editors 
explain that they focus on economics and biology 
because these are fertile fields that involve new 
and significant philosophical issues.
As the book title indicates, the focus is on mech-
anisms and causation. Mechanisms have become 
fashionable in philosophical discussions of biology 
(according to Till Grüne-Yanoff), and they appear 
in economics in such terms as market mechanism 
and mechanism design. The editors express the 
view that causation is a topic under active devel-
opment, particularly in economics, which seems 
a questionable contention. Most of the authors 
of these papers are primarily oriented toward 
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 philosophy, and have a secondary interest in eco-
nomics or biology (or both, or neither). The book 
is therefore likely to be of more interest to philos-
ophers than to practicing economists or biologists, 
who are not drawn to the philosophical mindset.
Philosophers are well aware that the modern 
treatment of causation, insofar as there is one, 
originated in the economics literature with the 
Cowles Commission economists. The focus is 
on criteria for causation in formal models, rather 
than in the world. Herbert Simon’s classic 1953 
paper is the major example, with related work by 
Trygve Haavelmo, Ragnar Frisch, and Nikolaas 
Tinbergen. The last of these is extensively dis-
cussed in Marcel Boumans’s paper in this volume. 
However, analysis of causation has virtually dis-
appeared from the economics literature (except 
in the guise of Granger causation, with the mean-
ing of causation morphed into predictability).
It is worth inquiring why formal analysis 
of causation has dropped out of economics. 
Unfortunately, the papers in the volume under 
review do not address this question. The reason 
appears to be that the Cowles treatment of causa-
tion was based on structural models. These have 
undergone drastic revision in current economic 
analysis. For Simon a (linear) structural model was 
one in which internal variables are linear functions 
of other internal variables and external variables. 
Questions of causation were analyzed in terms 
of interventions—hypothetical alterations—on 
the coefficients of the structural equations. This 
procedure implicitly redefined the coefficients as 
external variables, rather than constants. Under 
this treatment, structural models in effect have 
two types of external variables: the additive errors 
that represent the routine operation of the model 
and the coefficients that represent interven-
tions. As a result, structural models are properly 
regarded as bilinear rather than linear.1
Contemporary practice in economic model 
building is very different: coefficients of linear 
equations are viewed as shallow parameters; 
functions of the deep parameters of tastes and 
technology. Shallow and deep parameters are 
1 These ideas are discussed further in LeRoy 2014. 
That paper presents a discussion of causality that avoids 
reference to an underlying model that is structural in the 
sense of the Cowles economists.
linked by cross-equation restrictions. The Lucas 
critique, at least in one version, consisted of 
the reminder that the coefficients of linearized 
models, being causal consequences of the deep 
parameters, cannot be treated as variation free, 
as was explicitly assumed in the Cowles treat-
ment of causation. Thus the Cowles concep-
tion of structural models, which underlies most 
theorizing on causation by noneconomists, has 
largely disappeared from mainstream practice 
by economists. With it, we lost the Cowles anal-
ysis of causation.
Economists reading these essays will be 
reminded how different economics and phi-
losophy are. The questions being addressed, the 
meanings of words, and the common conceptual 
backgrounds that authors draw on are all different. 
As a result, in varying degrees, these essays are dif-
ficult for economists to read and interpret. Take, 
for example, Boumans’s essay “The Regrettable 
Loss of Mathematical Molding in Econometrics.” 
The argument here is that the tradition of math-
ematical molding that had characterized busi-
ness cycle analysis from the 1920s through the 
1940s was lost with (or after; it is not clear) the 
Probabilistic Revolution in econometrics. The 
problem is that I am not familiar with the term 
mathematical molding. At first I thought molding 
was a typographical error for modeling, but this 
possibility is contradicted by several sentences that 
contain both words. Outsiders like me would have 
benefited from a definition of mathematical mold-
ing, but it is difficult to find one. The reader is left 
to infer a definition from passages like this (p. 62):
Mathematical molding disappeared in the 
changeover from mechanisms to specify causal 
mechnisms of business cycles to methods to 
identify economic structures, that is, invariant 
relationships underlying the workings of an 
economy. . . . When the econometric program 
shifted its focus from mechanisms explaining 
phenomena to uncovering structural relation-
ships, direct feedback from the phenomenon 
to the mechanism was lost, and the role of 
mathematical molding ceased to exist.
I do not know what any of this means.
Tinbergen, whose work is discussed in detail 
in this essay, is identified with the  mathematical 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (December 2014)1162
molding  tradition, but Boumans does not tell 
us which authors led the movement away from 
mathematical molding. Tinbergen was con-
cerned with formulating models that produce 
cyclical behavior, but there is no way to argue 
that this research question has been abandoned 
in the more recent literature: a major concern 
in the real business cycle literature has been 
to produce models that produce significant 
 business-cycle dynamics. I cannot find any dis-
cussion of why the move away from mathemati-
cal molding is regrettable, as advertised in the 
title of the paper.
Several of the essays make very worthwhile read-
ing. Grüne-Yanoff compares the use of models 
incorporating replicator dynamics in evolutionary 
game theory in economics with their counter-
parts in biology. He concludes that the differences 
between the two are great enough to lead him 
to reject viewing replicator dynamics as a single 
mechanism that subsumes both social and biologi-
cal applications. Also,  Ruey-Lin Chen’s discussion 
of discovery generated by experimentation (as dis-
tinguished from theory-based discovery, such as 
that of Einstein) in the context of Gregor Mendel 
and his predecessors in genetics is interesting.
One is gratified that philosophers are finding 
rich source material in substantive disciplines 
like economics, as opposed to basing their dis-
quisitions exclusively on the mechanics of toast-
ers and the like. Nevertheless, it is not likely that 
books like this will induce economists or biolo-
gists to pay substantially more attention to the 
philosophy literature than they have in the past.
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B History of Economic Thought, 
Methodology, and Heterodox 
Approaches
Defending the History of Economic Thought. 
By Steven Kates. Cheltenham, U.K. and 
Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2013. Pp. x, 140. 
$99.95. ISBN 978–1–84844–820–9.  
 JEL 2014–0007
Steven Kates’s book Defending the History of 
Economic Thought comes at just the right time. 
As the history of economic thought (HET) often 
regains importance in times after economic crises, 
it is also since the financial crisis of 2008 that parts 
of the economics profession have become more 
self-reflexive, acknowledging to a certain extent 
the shortcomings of economic models in predict-
ing what happened (see e.g., Hoover 2010). The 
fact that some economists turned towards the his-
tory of their subject matter in substantiating such 
arguments naturally provokes questions about the 
role that HET could and should play in economics. 
As for historians of economics, they have been 
rethinking their identity for some time now. Being 
under constant exposure to a persisting decline 
of the field, questions about the ideal intellec-
tual home, the appropriate methodology and the 
subject matter of HET have been continuously 
addressed in the last decades (see e.g., Medema 
and Samuels 2001, Moscati 2008, Schabas 1992, 
Weintraub 1989 and 2002). Thus, the concrete 
arguments that Kates provides as to what histo-
rians of economics should do and how they can 
contribute to economics is a relevant topic. 
However, I doubt that Kates’s book offers what 
is needed for fruitfully advancing the debate. 
It fails to provide convincing arguments for the 
importance of HET as a self-contained field that 
is valuable in itself, and as a pluralistic enterprise 
that might produce knowledge of interest for 
mainstream economics, but also beyond. 
The main message of Kates’s book is that HET is 
a constitutive part of economics, which is why HET 
should be preserved as constitutive of the econom-
ics profession. To support his position, Kates devel-
ops a multilayered argument for why HET would 
significantly improve teaching, research, and the-
ory application in economics, and why it should 
therefore be considered a core element of the dis-
cipline. Like many contributions debating the role 
of HET, Kates’s project is marked by normative 
undertones. But the book aspires to provide more 
than a general proposal. It is structured as a user’s 
guide, giving concrete advice for defending HET 
against serious threats to remove it as a subfield 
from economics. The target audience of the book 
is broad, spanning researchers and students of 
economics,  professional economists outside of aca-
demia, the economic policy maker, communicators 
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of economic concepts to the layman, and the every-
day individual having an interest in economics. It is 
the interests of those groups for Kates that suggest 
the relevance of HET for current economic affairs.
Kates lays out his arguments in five short chap-
ters. After sketching his motivation and general 
position in chapter one, Kates presents various 
arguments for why studying HET would make 
someone a better economist in chapter two. 
“Better” thereby refers to improving a person’s 
capability and skills to solve today’s economic 
problems. Much of this argumentation implicitly 
rests upon a “presentist” view of history, that is, 
a view that considers understanding history not 
as an important enterprise in its own right, but 
instead interprets the past in terms of present-
day interests and theories of economists (e.g., 
Medema and Samuels 2001). On this view, HET 
is to be consulted as a “storehouse of [potentially 
relevant] economic ideas”; as engaging in a “con-
versation with economists of the past” that can 
illuminate debates in the present; as educating 
economists to write about and communicate 
technical concepts and mathematical arguments 
in everyday language; and as a way to better 
understand the scope of application of a specific 
theory or concept (p. 16 ff.). In turn, “[a]n econo-
mist without the kinds of knowledge that HET 
provides, so far as their role as economists is con-
cerned, is no better than a tradesmen. They may 
be able to run a regression but they are not schol-
ars as it was once understood” (p. 41). 
The third chapter discusses the main positions 
brought forward in the debates about the relation-
ship between HET and mainstream economics. 
Kates identifies at least two main strategies in 
the literature to defending HET against “hostil-
ity from the mainstream” (p. 43). The first strat-
egy is to ensure that HET does not automatically 
result in criticism of (present-day) economics; the 
second strategy is to outsource HET to the history 
and philosophy of science. Kates himself repudi-
ates both strategies. Because a part of his proposal 
rests on the idea that HET allows for testing main-
stream economic theories, Kates rejects the first 
strategy by arguing that studying the history of 
theories must inevitably be  accompanied by a criti-
cal stance; and it also should. He rejects the second 
strategy because it commits to the general view 
that history of science should not primarily aim 
at making a difference to the science itself, a view 
that is common in the history of science but that 
Kates disagrees with. Rather, the main purpose 
of studying HET according to Kates is to improve 
current economic theory. Thereby, the historian 
of economics is effectively a mediator who trans-
lates old ideas and concepts into modern language, 
illustrates the continued relevance for mainstream 
economics today (p. 69), and directly contributes 
to how economics is currently practiced.
This idea of improving present mainstream 
economics through the study of HET has obvi-
ous implications for the relevance of HET in 
teaching economics. In the fourth chapter, Kates 
argues that understanding the historical origins 
of theories is of critical importance in the social 
sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, where new 
theories irreversibly replace older ones, past eco-
nomic theories can regain relevance if and as they 
inform current discussion and illuminate con-
temporary problems. Consequently, it is crucial 
to teach economic theories not as ultimate truths 
but as provisional conclusions, thereby retain-
ing openness to their possible return as well as 
to alternative ways of thinking. Furthermore, by 
helping us distance ourselves from our own time 
and place, HET makes us understand the purpose 
that a theory was originally developed to fulfill 
and the boundaries between useful and mis-
guided applications. As the denial of such history 
can mislead us in our applications, the student of 
economics without a background in HET is “less 
well equipped [. . .] than one who does have such 
knowledge” (p. 21). To function as a kind of user’s 
guide to theory application, teaching HET is to 
consist of studying—in chronological order—the 
original textbooks that were once considered part 
of the canon. Containing the major concepts and 
theories that were used in a given period of time, 
Kates considers such textbooks as representative 
for the theoretical toolbox available to economists 
and, as such, as providing the “context” neces-
sary for better understanding how theories have 
been, and are to be, changed and applied (p. 101). 
However, as for Kates only those past theories are 
relevant that help us understand current ones, 
the textbooks to be studied should be those that 
have had  considerable influence on mainstream 
 economic theories. Marxist economics and 
Austrian  economics, for example, should thus be 
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excluded from teaching HET on the grounds that 
those traditions never had a profound impact (p. 
95), a claim that to my mind is the least convinc-
ing part of the book.
In the final chapter, Kates discusses two recent 
attempts by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
and the European Research Council to remove 
HET from the economics research classification 
scheme. Successful exclusion would surely have 
far-reaching implications for the HET community, 
its location, and its research orientation, which is 
why this chapter provides interesting and relevant 
insights into the actual policy dimension of science 
and the production of knowledge. Drawing upon 
his personal engagement in these “classification 
wars” (p. 107), Kates presents a proposal for taking 
action against such reclassification attempts. This 
proposal is the most persuasive part of the book. 
Kates analyses the practical implications of such a 
reclassification for the status of HET as a field of 
study and supports his analysis with personal anec-
dotes and correspondence with respective authori-
ties. He furthermore puts together a twelve-step 
action plan in order to convince economists (and 
administrative authorities) of the benefits of pre-
serving HET as a core field of enquiry that should 
remain within the economics profession. 
Most historians of economics would prob-
ably agree that studying HET should, for vari-
ous reasons, be essential for modern economics. 
However, Kates’s position has implications for the 
type of knowledge to be produced by historians 
of economics, the methodology to be applied in 
HET, and the status of HET as a discipline. To 
emphasize the primary concern of HET to have 
an impact on current economics, Kates’s pro-
posal diminishes the importance of HET as a 
 self-contained field of study and downplays the 
idea that scholarship undertaken by historians of 
economics has value in its own right.
First, adopting Kates’s view of HET would 
severely limit the scope of enquiry of the historian 
of economics. Kates commits to a particular view 
of what economics is, what historians of econom-
ics do, and what both fields should be concerned 
with. Having undergone a professional career in 
Australian politics (p. 106), Kates takes a  pragmatic 
stance. He defines economics as an “amalgam 
of theories and techniques that can be used to 
make sense of the ways in which we provide for 
our material wellbeing” (2013, viii). As for Kates, 
economics is primarily a policy science (p. 20), it 
follows that a large number of people involved 
in economics as an academic profession will ulti-
mately work in practical fields where those theo-
ries and techniques become applied to concrete 
policy problems. From this view of economics 
and of the task of an economist follows a spe-
cific and rather narrow conception of history and 
view of what a historian of economics should do. 
Understood primarily as a constitutive part of eco-
nomics, HET has itself to be “a form of technique” 
(p. 15). Studying HET as such a technique enables 
the student to broaden her thinking beyond an 
accepted paradigm, to acknowledge the potential 
depth of economic analysis, to accept the con-
tingent truth of economic theories, and to better 
understand the scope of application of a particular 
theory. Yet maintaining this link between HET and 
contemporary economics defined as a policy sci-
ence comes at the price of confining HET to only 
studying the history of canonical economic ideas. 
Such an understanding of HET as 
Dogmengeschichte or the history of ideas is not 
only a rather outdated view of how the history 
of a science should be studied. It also ignores 
the various historiographical developments that 
HET has recently undergone and that contrib-
ute to its evolving into a pluralistic field of study. 
Historians of economics increasingly use a vari-
ety of new techniques and exciting sources that 
provoke new questions for further study. The 
availability of archival material and the possibil-
ity of drawing upon papers from some of the most 
prominent economists of the twentieth century 
have made the study of HET not only a fasci-
nating, but also an extremely worthwhile enter-
prise in its own right.1 Such sources  furthermore 
require  innovative methods that allow for  placing 
economic ideas into their social, cultural, and 
epistemic contexts. Pursuing HET in the ser-
vice of modern economics only and focusing on 
1 One example is the Economists’ Papers Project, initi-
ated in the 1980s by the Center for the History of Political 
Economy at Duke University. The archive comprises the 
correspondence, manuscripts, drafts, memoirs, inter-
views, diaries, documents from administrative duties and 
political involvements, teaching documents, etc. of more 
than forty distinguished economists that have mostly lived 
during the twentieth century (see Weintraub et al. 1998).
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the study of past textbooks, in contrast, leads to 
the exclusion of various ways in which HET has 
been practiced and flourished in recent decades. 
Furthermore, by precluding noneconomists from 
the field (p. 50), Kates’s proposal discounts the 
value of many excellent projects currently under-
taken by noneconomists within HET and thereby 
prevents HET from progressing as an innovative 
and self-contained field of study.
Second, Kates’s arguments also fail to identify 
the distinctive value of HET, its usefulness for 
mainstream economics, and beyond. Apart from 
being rather ad hoc and unsupported by empiri-
cal evidence, Kates’s arguments hinge on the idea 
that studying HET will provide specific skills to 
the student that get lost in a discipline that focuses 
more on mathematical tools and statistical tech-
niques than on interpretation. While indeed, con-
vincing arguments can be made in favor of a more 
pluralistic and diverse education as being desirable 
in economics, it is not only HET that would incor-
porate a level of reflection and diversity into the 
curriculum. As Kates’s arguments often sound as 
though primarily formulating a critical view about 
the extensive use of mathematics and statistics in 
economics, various courses on nonmathematical 
subjects or courses from a humanistic education 
that would broaden the narrow education of econ-
omists could do the job. For example, a similar 
argument could be made for including mandatory 
courses in economic methodology or philosophy 
of economics into the economics curriculum. It is 
not the unique nature of HET that allows for it to 
play the role in economics that Kates envisions as 
justifying its pursuit. 
Two questions that seem to be crucial for 
advancing the debate about the role of HET for 
current economics are what the community of 
HET ultimately wishes to accomplish and what 
economists are ultimately interested in when 
consulting HET. Much of recent work in HET 
suggests that its development towards becoming 
a self-contained discipline with a broader historio-
graphical focus is desirable. Such a development 
would not necessarily exclude the history of ideas 
from its agenda. But the history of ideas would 
be complemented by high-quality historical and 
methodological work that rests upon employing 
the appropriate historical and  philosophical tools. 
Such scholarship, I would argue, might have more 
chances of arousing the interest of economists 
than any attempt by a nonspecialist to change 
some economic concept or a theory, which is 
itself part of a highly specialized subfield and 
requires the respective skill. Rather, the historian 
of economics could be consulted as a specialist 
in her field of expertise, thereby mastering the 
methods and tools from the history of science 
that she is expected to apply. Such a step would 
allow HET to become a self-contained field of 
study that could produce knowledge accepted by, 
useful and relevant not only for, mainstream eco-
nomics but also beyond. 
References
Hoover, Kevin D. 2010. “Introduction: Methodologi-
cal Implications of the Financial Crisis.” Journal of 
Economic Methodology 17 (4): 397–98.
Medema, Steven G., and Warren J. Samuels, eds. 2001. 
Historians of Economics and Economic Thought: 
The Construction of Disciplinary Memory. New 
York: Taylor and Francis, Routledge.
Moscati, Ivan. 2008. “More Economics, Please: We’re 
Historians of Economics.” Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought 30 (1): 85–92.
Schabas, Margaret. 1992. “Breaking Away: History of 
Economics as History of Science.” History of Politi-
cal Economy 24 (1): 187–203.
Weintraub, E. Roy. 1989. “Methodology Doesn’t Mat-
ter, But the History of Thought Might.” Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics 91 (2): 477–93.
Weintraub, E. Roy, ed. 2002. “The Future of the His-
tory of Economics.” History of Political Economy. 
Annual Supplement 34.
Weintraub, E. Roy, Stephen J. Meardon, Ted Gayer, 
and H. Spencer Banzhaf. 1998. “Archiving the 
 History of Economics.” Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 36 (3): 1496–1501.
Catherine Herfeld
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
F. A. Hayek and the Modern Economy: Economic 
Organization and Activity. Edited by Sandra 
J. Peart and David M. Levy. Jepson Studies 
in Leadership series. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. xviii, 247. 
ISBN 978–1–137–35958–2. 
 JEL 2014–0424
This volume grew out of a conference on “Hayek 
and the Modern World” held in April of 2013 at 
the University of Richmond. All but one of the 
chapters were presented there in some form. 
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Because Friedrich Hayek’s work is so wide-
ranging and because of the growth in Hayek 
scholarship in the last couple of decades, the 
major challenge facing any new collection of 
essays on Hayek is finding a theme or provid-
ing enough new insight to provide value added 
for readers. Although the volume lacks a clearly 
defined theme, many of the ten substantive 
chapters address areas left underexplored by 
previous scholarship, or offer new insights on 
 well-established areas of Hayek’s thought.
Peter McNamara’s opening chapter “On 
Hayek’s Unsentimental Liberalism” explores 
Hayek’s relationship with Adam Smith by not-
ing that, unlike Smith’s emphasis on sympathy in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Hayek offers no 
account of human nature in his work. McNamara 
argues that Smith’s account is actually consistent 
with modern work on neuroscience and socio-
biology/evolutionary psychology, giving it an 
advantage over Hayek. McNamara may be cor-
rect about Smith, but he ignores Hayek’s book 
The Sensory Order, in which Hayek does pro-
vide an account of human cognition that is con-
sistent with modern work. Hayek’s argument in 
that book is especially interesting when read in 
conjunction with both modern neuroscience and 
Smith on the moral sentiments.
Three of the chapters address Hayek’s activities 
and influence in the decade of the 1940s. Editors 
Sandra Peart and David Levy’s contribution looks 
at Hayek’s relationship with a particular group of 
American “individualists” in the years leading 
up to the creation of the Mont Pelerin Society 
in 1947. That group was, despite their claimed 
commitment to laissez-faire, deeply influenced 
by eugenic and anti-Semitic thinking. Peart and 
Levy argue that Hayek’s belief in the importance 
of population growth, and what they call the 
“analytical egalitarianism” of classical liberalism, 
distanced him from the more odious forms of 
laissez-faire at play in the 1940s.
Ekkehard Kohler and Stefan Kolev argue in 
their essay that there are deep similarities among 
the reform programs put forward in the 1930s 
and 1940s by the “Old Chicago” school of Henry 
Simons, the Freiburg School of Walter Eucken, 
and Hayek’s ideas. What they shared was a rejec-
tion of the old idea of “laissez-faire,” understood 
as a complete absence of government action. 
Instead, all three groups had a “positive pro-
gram” for reform that emphasized the need for 
governments to more actively create the “rules 
of the game” or framework within which com-
petition and the market order unfolded. Getting 
those rules right, for example deciding whether 
different monetary institutions are needed, was 
the best way to understand government’s role in 
reform. The authors make a compelling case for 
the overlap of these research programs, and their 
continued joint relevance can be seen in contem-
porary work that draws on a mixture of public 
choice theory, new institutionalism, and Austrian 
economics to offer similar analyses of the neces-
sity of the right rules.
The third of the 1940s chapters is Andrew 
Farrant and Nicola Tynan’s discussion of Hayek, 
Clement Atlee, and the “Control of Engagement 
Order” passed in Britain in the fall of 1947. 
A number of conservative British politicians, 
including a young Margaret Thatcher, had argued 
that this law and its purported attempt to allo-
cate labor from the top down was evidence of 
what they saw as Hayek’s thesis in The Road to 
Serfdom: that economic planning would eventu-
ally lead to some form of totalitarianism. Hayek 
also made similar claims. Farrant and Tynan offer 
archival evidence that their concerns were over-
blown and that the actual scope and effects of the 
order were limited. To the degree that the order 
was being used as evidence in support of Hayek’s 
thesis, the authors argue that was a mistake. This 
chapter offers a nice example of the way archival 
work can help us better understand the influence 
of Hayek’s ideas.
Two other chapters worth noting are Gerald 
Gaus’s attempt to expand our understanding of 
Hayek’s evolutionary account of morality by the 
use of “evolutionary adaptive landscapes.” Gaus’s 
argument enables theorists to account for the 
evolutionary processes that produce social moral-
ity while still having a standpoint from which to 
judge any given outcome without falling for the 
Nirvana Fallacy. This chapter is an important 
technical contribution to Hayekian thought.
Christopher Martin’s chapter suggests that 
Hayek’s understanding of Athenian democracy 
used to construct his ideal constitution in the 
third volume of Law, Legislation, and Liberty is 
historically suspect. Martin argues that Hayek’s 
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attempt to limit the role of political faction would 
have “benefited from more appreciation of the 
later Athenian constitution and its use of randomly 
chosen juries to decide constitutional questions” 
(p. 148). Martin opens up an intriguing line of 
research in connecting Hayek more accurately to 
the ancient Greeks than Hayek did himself.
Hayek scholars will learn much from this vol-
ume, though it is not suitable as an introduction 
to his work. Historians of economic thought and 
historians of the discipline will find value here 
as well, particularly in the chapters on Hayek’s 
influences and his role in the 1940s. Several of 
these chapters open up fascinating new avenues 
for research on Hayek, and those engaged in such 
work will want to explore what it has to offer.
Steven Horwitz
St. Lawrence University
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Game-Changer: Game Theory and the Art of 
Transforming Strategic Situations. By David 
McAdams. New York and London: W. W. 
Norton, 2014. Pp. 303. $26.95. ISBN 978–0–
393–23967–6. JEL 2014–0437
The premise of David McAdams’s new book 
Game-Changer is that in order to change the 
outcome of a strategic situation, one first has 
to understand the incentives faced by the indi-
viduals who are making decisions. Only then is 
it possible to design a policy that realigns private 
goals with those of the policy maker. McAdams 
brings this perspective to a broad audience with 
a nontechnical introduction to basic game theory. 
Through a variety of interesting and colorful 
examples, he argues that game theoretic concepts 
can be used to clarify the relationship between 
incentives and behavior. Such an analysis can 
reveal opportunities to transform the strategic 
situation, and thereby solve practical problems in 
business and public policy.
The book is split into two parts, the first of 
which deals with methodology and the second 
gives applications. Part one focuses on the stra-
tegic transformations one can use to change the 
game. Interspersed throughout are three “Game 
Theory Focuses” that describe various types of 
games and solution concepts, and they even touch 
on more advanced concepts such as evolutionary 
stability. The theory is explained with a bare min-
imum of formalism, which is essentially limited 
to graphical depictions of games as payoff matri-
ces and trees. This half of the book hums along 
with plenty of anecdotes for illustration, and to 
break up some of the drier material. Regulation 
of cigarette advertising, the cartelization of chari-
table fundraising, and the Battle of the Bismarck 
Sea are among the many examples that make 
appearances, as well as McAdams’s hypothetical 
adventures convincing his children to eat their 
vegetables.
Game-Changer develops a somewhat distinc-
tive style and terminology that will be evocative 
for the uninitiated, but will require some adjust-
ment for those already familiar with the material. 
Some terms, such as “rollback equilibrium,” used 
in lieu of subgame perfect equilibrium, are sim-
ply a relabeling of familiar concepts. Others, such 
as “commitment moves” for actions that commit 
one to a particular behavior at a later date, draw 
distinctions that are not usually made in standard 
treatments. These idiosyncrasies will create some 
adjustment cost for the reader who plans to delve 
further into the subject.
The majority of the analysis is focused on the 
prisoners’ dilemma as a canonical model of ineffi-
cient self-interest. The transformative techniques 
are geared towards moving the players in that 
game to the efficient outcome through govern-
ment regulation (chapter 2), merger (chapter 3), 
and the addition of various kinds of dynamic 
incentives (chapters 4, 5, and 6). For the most 
part, these techniques correspond to viewing the 
prisoners’ dilemma as being embedded within 
a broader game, in which the putative game-
changer has actions that shift payoffs in a man-
ner that heads off social inefficiency. Whether or 
not one views these transformations as changes 
to the game or as actions in an expanded model, 
McAdams’s point is that the minimalist prison-
ers’ dilemma is rarely a complete description 
of the strategic options. To realize all routes to 
improving the outcome, one should try to take 
an expansive view of the mechanisms that shape 
incentives.
Most of the extensions to the prisoners’ 
dilemma have readily identifiable inspirations in 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (December 2014)1168
the academic literature, such as classical regula-
tion and merger analysis for chapters 2 and 3 and 
repeated games for chapter 6. For others, it is less 
obvious what formal model lies behind the prose. 
Chapter 5 discusses “trust” as a way to avoid inef-
ficient outcomes in a sequential move prison-
ers’ dilemma. At times, McAdams suggests that 
rational agents can instill trust in others through 
impassioned and sincere speeches, which pre-
sumably constitute a kind of costly signaling 
about one’s true preferences. Elsewhere, trust 
seems to reflect a concern for long-term reputa-
tion on the part of a “trustworthy” second-mover. 
This explanation overlaps with McAdams’s later 
reference to reputation effects in leveraging rela-
tionships, and it is not entirely clear how the two 
approaches differ.
Though other games make occasional appear-
ances, the primary explanatory tool throughout the 
exposition is the prisoners’ dilemma. The reader is 
thus left with a somewhat narrow view of the range 
of phenomena that can be understood using the 
game-theoretic approach. Coordination games are 
only mentioned in passing, and the role of incom-
plete information is hardly touched on at all. Those 
who are interested will have to look elsewhere for 
an introduction to these important topics.
The second half of the book applies the trans-
formation techniques in a series of case studies. 
These “Game-Changer Files” describe social 
inefficiencies in situations ranging from fisheries 
regulation to real estate agency to online market-
place reputation. For each file, the author argues 
that there exist feasible policies that would mod-
ify incentives and increase social efficiency. Some 
of the suggestions seem more practically useful 
than others. One can certainly envision random 
sampling of fishing catches, with no penalties 
attached, to accurately estimate stocks and cali-
brate an industry-wide quota. It is less easy to see 
how game theoretic insights will transform the 
fight against antibiotic resistant bacteria without 
significant breakthroughs in medical technology. 
Nonetheless, these case studies serve to illustrate 
the core message of the book, which is the prac-
tical usefulness of game theory for policy analy-
sis. More than any specific prescription or case 
study, the value of the game theoretic approach 
is as a framework for understanding strategic 
interactions.
Ultimately, does Game-Changer provide 
a “radically new . . . way to outstrategize your 
rivals,” as promised by the dust jacket? For those 
who are new to the subject, the book provides an 
accessible and broad introduction to the possi-
bilities of game theory, which will facilitate new 
ways of thinking outside the box about strategic 
situations. Academic economists, on the other 
hand, will appreciate the trove of well-chosen 
and colorful examples. While the material is 
unlikely to be radically new for the latter audi-
ence, Game-Changer is nonetheless an enjoy-
able read.
Ben Brooks
Becker Friedman Institute
E Macroeconomics and Monetary 
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Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing 
Sustainability. By Marc Fleurbaey and Didier 
Blanchet. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 306. ISBN 978–
0–19–976719–9. JEL 2013–0708
What are good indicators of social perfor-
mance? How to measure whether societies prog-
ress? Which societies are better, as evaluated by 
the interests of the individuals living in those 
societies?
During the last decades, per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) has been used as an 
indicator of countries’ success by economists and 
others. Simultaneously, GDP has been severely 
criticized, leading to a plethora of alternative 
indicators. In this book, Fleurbaey and Blanchet 
present an impressive comprehensive study of 
alternatives to GDP and their foundations. It dis-
cusses different classes of indicators in a thorough 
and thought-provoking manner, with the motiva-
tion of contributing to better practical measures 
of welfare and sustainability.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the role of sustainabil-
ity indicators, arguing for the need to differenti-
ate between a dynamic measure for the long-run 
sustainability of the current situation and a static 
measure for the goodness of the current situation. 
The remainder of the volume is devoted to the 
latter challenge of developing such a static mea-
sure of current social well-being. It identifies and 
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discusses four alternative approaches in chapters 
1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Chapter 1 presents the first approach where 
various indicators of social performance are 
gathered into a hybrid, composite index. The 
Human Development Index (HDI) is the most 
well-known example. The chapter discusses the 
problems associated with such ad hoc indices. 
In particular, it is pointed out how, in the HDI, 
the valuation of longevity depends in an arbitrary 
manner on the methodology being applied.
Chapters 3 and 4 develop two alternative ver-
sions of the monetary approach, where the mon-
etary metric of the GDP is kept, but its content 
is changed. One version is based on uniform 
pricing; the other is based on individual willing-
ness-to-pay and “equivalent income.” A central 
argument is developed, namely that the concept 
of “equivalent income” is a monetary indicator 
that respects the diversity of individual prefer-
ences in a context where the sources of human 
well-being extend beyond the vector of market-
able commodities.
Chapter 5 discusses a third approach, where 
“happiness” as a subjective measure of well-being 
is obtained directly through questionnaires. The 
authors argue forcefully that it is difficult to 
use such data for ethically sound comparisons 
between individuals with different preferences 
about various aspects of life (e.g., as expressed 
through different aspiration levels).
Chapter 6 deals with the fourth and final 
approach, namely Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach (CA), ending with the following claim: 
If the CA is developed in a way that respects 
the diverse individual values—which is a route 
that exerts strong appeal—then the “equivalent-
income” approach can be proposed as a possible 
methodology for the application of the CA.
The book’s concluding chapter summarizes the 
lessons learned in the discussions of the sustain-
ability and the various approaches to measuring 
current social well-being, ending with concrete 
and pragmatic advice. Finally, two appendices 
present a theory of the reference for equivalent 
incomes and include proofs of various results.
By giving a comprehensive treatment of the 
technical and ethical problems associated with 
the challenge of measuring social well-being, 
this book is a very important contribution. The 
authors evaluate, in detail, the theoretical foun-
dations of each approach to measuring current 
social well-being, while keeping in mind the 
pragmatic goal of contributing to better practi-
cally implementable measures. The book is acces-
sible to readers with an interest in, and familiarity 
with, the main concepts and issues and no more 
than an undergraduate background in economics 
is necessary for most of the text. Figures provide 
useful empirical evidence, ensuring that the book 
is not a theoretical discussion without empirical 
underpinnings.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem of social choice 
has discouraged many economists from attempt-
ing to measure social well-being, since this theo-
rem is usually interpreted as implying that there 
is no reasonable social evaluation methodology 
that respects individual ordinal preferences and 
does not rely on extra utility information. The 
“equivalent-income” approach illustrates this 
problem, since it respects unanimous individual 
preferences without assigning a dictatorial role 
to one particular individual. However, it violates 
Arrow independence (as the social ranking of any 
pair of alternatives depends not only on how the 
individuals rank these two alternatives). With a 
reference to the theory of fair allocation (in par-
ticular, as developed into a theory of “fair social 
choice” by Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011), the 
authors argue in chapter 4 that Arrow indepen-
dence is not compelling. Therefore, the “equiva-
lent income” approach is not flawed, but allows 
comparisons of the well-being of different indi-
viduals, while respecting their preferences and 
taking into account that their situations differ.
The interesting treatment of “happiness” indi-
cators in chapter 5 could have been comple-
mented by a discussion of an evolutionary theory 
of happiness, put forward by Samuelson (2004) 
and Rayo and Becker (2007). Their main argu-
ment is that the subjective feeling of happiness 
is a relative scale that works as an optimal incen-
tive scheme for the purpose of promoting effort. 
Information about the success of others indicates 
available opportunities, and a low subjective feel-
ing of happiness of a disadvantaged but capable 
individual has the effect of motivating the indi-
vidual to take advantage of those opportunities. 
In contrast, paraplegic individuals might not, in 
the long run, feel unhappy about their inability to 
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take part in useful and enjoyable physical activi-
ties, as increased motivation in this direction is 
not productive. This evolutionary theory of hap-
piness further undermines the normative appeal 
of “happiness” indicators, and reinforces the con-
clusions that the authors reach in this chapter.
The book treats the question of measuring sus-
tainability as a separate issue from the issue of 
measuring static well-being. The former ques-
tion relates to whether the current opportunities 
are used in a manner that reduces, in a relevant 
sense, the opportunities for future generations. If 
not, these opportunities are utilized in a sustain-
able manner. However, as is evident from the dis-
cussion of the capability approach, the available 
opportunities also matter at an individual level, 
not only how these opportunities are utilized. A 
key example is that fasting is different from starv-
ing, because it involves a possibility of greater 
nutritional achievement that is absent from the 
starvation situation. Moreover, one might argue 
that there are a number of challenges that must be 
confronted both at an individual and social level, 
in addition to the issue of relating the current set 
of opportunities to the current level of well-being.
One such issue is how societies and individu-
als should rank the elements in their opportunity 
sets (or their current vector of “consumption,” 
in a wide sense) from a normative perspective. A 
separate but related issue is to what extent soci-
eties and individuals are able to implement good 
choices, when taking into account government fail-
ure at a social level and problems of self-reflection 
and self-control at an individual level. Even though 
these issues are discussed throughout the book, 
their relevance at both a social and individual level 
is not applied consistently as an integrating device.
It would also have been very interesting if the 
issue of assessing sustainability (which is one of 
two issues mentioned in the subtitle of the book) 
were revisited at the end of the book. In my opin-
ion, an appropriate measure of static well-being is 
a prerequisite for a relevant measure of sustain-
ability. At an abstract level, the concept of green 
(or comprehensive) NNP can be understood as 
a measure of opportunities in the same metric 
as the appropriate measure of static well-being. 
Denoting green NNP by y and static well-being 
by u, the development of green NNP might be 
governed the following differential equation, 
dy/dt = r(y − u), where r is a real rate of interest 
that depends on the metric being used. Hence, 
for the purpose of indicating sustainability, it is 
not the difference between conventional GDP 
and an adjusted measure of green NNP that mat-
ters, but whether the latter concept signals pru-
dent behavior by having a positive growth rate, or 
equivalently, by exceeding the appropriate mea-
sure of static well-being.
This points to a more general insight: That in 
order to answer the questions posed at the begin-
ning of this review—how to measure whether 
societies progress; which societies are better, as 
evaluated by the interests of the individuals living 
in the society—we are not interested in the abso-
lute size of the appropriate measures, nor how 
they compare to conventional measures. We are 
interested in how the relevant measures develop 
through time, and how such measures vary across 
different societies. The book by Fleurbaey and 
Blanchet is essential reading for economists who 
want a critical and wide-ranging assessment of 
the different approaches that have been sug-
gested as such measures of social performance.
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How asset prices react to new information has 
been a topic of long-standing interest in finance. 
In this book, Dr. Guo Ying Luo  theoretically 
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 studies this topic by incorporating two well-
known behavioral biases into the standard 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) framework and the 
Kyle (1985) model. 
This book is relatively short and is extremely 
well-organized. In chapter 1, Luo reviews the 
empirical evidence on underreaction and overre-
action in asset prices, and briefly surveys leading 
behavioral models of underreaction and over-
reaction. Chapter 2 shows that in an extended 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model, conservatism 
bias can generate both asset price overreaction and 
underreaction to new information in a perfectly 
competitive market with noise traders. Chapter 3 
illustrates that in an extended Kyle (1985) model, 
conservatism bias can generate asset price overre-
action and underreaction in a market allowing for 
strategic interaction among rational and conserva-
tism traders. Chapters 4 and 5 basically repeat the 
analysis in chapters 2 and 3 by replacing conser-
vatism bias with representativeness heuristic. Luo 
shows that representativeness heuristic can also 
generate both asset price overreaction and under-
reaction to new information either in a perfectly 
competitive market or in a market allowing for 
strategic interaction among rational and represen-
tativeness traders. Finally, chapter 6 incorporates 
both conservatism and representativeness into a 
standard static Kyle (1985) model to explain the 
phenomena of asset price overreaction and under-
reaction. As we can see, this short book offers new 
theoretical models of underreaction and overreac-
tion that are different from leading studies such 
as Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong 
and Stein (1999). In this sense, this book is more 
of an extended research paper. 
The usual criticism of behavioral studies is that 
there is too much freedom in choosing behavioral 
biases. In addition, different behavioral biases 
are sometimes required to account for differ-
ent asset pricing phenomena. In this book, Dr. 
Luo tries to avoid this criticism by focusing on 
two well-documented biases: conservatism and 
representativeness heuristic. These two biases 
have been replicated by many psychological stud-
ies and have already been extensively applied to 
the finance literature. More important, Dr. Luo 
shows that one single behavioral bias is enough to 
account for both underreaction and overreaction. 
Typically, researchers think that conservatism 
bias is responsible for underreaction, whereas 
representativeness heuristic is responsible for 
overreaction (see, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1998). Surprisingly, Luo shows that after 
introducing noise traders (whose demand is exog-
enously given), conservatism bias alone can lead 
to both underreaction and overreaction. Similarly, 
representativeness bias alone can also result in 
both underreaction and overreaction, under dif-
ferent parameterizations. I find that this result is 
quite surprising. Specifically, Luo forcefully illus-
trates that these two biases are very flexible in 
producing both underreaction and overreaction 
in asset prices. 
Given this flexibility in producing underreac-
tion and overreaction, I believe that it is especially 
important to provide more refutable implications 
of the models and test these implications with real 
data as well. For example, the book shows that 
under some parameterizations, asset prices over-
react to good news. However, these conditions are 
a bit abstract. Thus, it would be useful to translate 
these abstract parameterizations to more directly 
testable implications, so that empiricists can eas-
ily test these new implications. For instance, it 
would be nice to identify conditions under which 
the momentum effect or the reversal effect will 
be stronger or weaker. New empirical tests could 
validate/refute the importance of those biases 
in asset prices determination. Since the current 
book is more about the theoretical possibility to 
generate both under- and overreaction with a sin-
gle behavioral bias, it (understandably) lacks the 
empirical analysis. On the theory side, it would 
also be interesting to extend the static setting 
to a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, one 
may derive richer asset return dynamics based on 
these biases and probably provide more testable 
implications as well. Alternatively, it might also 
be interesting to introduce multiple risky assets 
into the current settings. This way, one can study 
cross-sectional anomalies more realistically. 
Given that it is theory oriented, this book might 
be too technical for general audiences such as pro-
fessional students in finance and economics. The 
ideal readers of this book would be PhD students 
and professors in finance and economics, espe-
cially those who have a special interest in behav-
ioral economics/finance. However,  readers should 
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note that many of the theorems in the book are 
not empirically tested yet. Thus, some of the con-
clusions might not be supported by the real data. 
Again, the book is mostly about theoretical explora-
tions and readers (especially PhD students) might 
find it fruitful to test some claims in the book. 
In sum, the book clearly shows that the two 
well-documented behavior biases are quite pow-
erful in producing both underreaction and over-
reaction in asset markets. What the paper lacks, 
in my view, is a clear delineation of the empirical 
implications of the model, so that the model can 
be easily taken to the data by empiricists. Overall, 
I find that this book provides a very nice theoreti-
cal contribution on how a simple behavioral bias 
such as conservatism or representativeness could 
result in both underreaction and overreaction 
simultaneously in a stylized two-period setting. 
References
Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 
1998. “A Model of Investor Sentiment.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 49 (3): 307–43.
Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Sub-
rahmanyam. 1998. “Investor Psychology and Secu-
rity Market Under- and Overreactions.” Journal of 
Finance 53 (6): 1839–85.
Grossman, Sanford J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1980. “On 
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Mar-
kets.” American Economic Review 70 (3): 393–408.
Hong, Harrison, and Jeremy C. Stein. 1999. “A Unified 
Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and 
Overreaction in Asset Markets.” Journal of Finance 
54 (6): 2143–84.
Kyle, Albert S. 1985. “Continuous Auctions and Insider 
Trading.” Econometrica 53 (6): 1315–35.
Jianfeng Yu
University of Minnesota and PBCSF, 
Tsinghua University 
The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U. S. and 
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The Great Recession increased the pressure 
on national and subnational budgets and often 
increased the level of public indebtedness. The 
common theme of this book, a collection of 
articles edited by Paul E. Peterson and Daniel 
Nadler, is how the increasing level of public debt 
affected the relationships between different 
levels of governments, and how preserving and 
reinforcing competitive federalism may offer a 
solution to the current “Debt Crisis.” 
All of the chapters, with one exception, are 
focused on subnational debt. State and local pub-
lic debt has been growing in importance both 
quantitatively and in the academic debate, and 
a book dealing with subnational debt after the 
Great Recession was long overdue. The first chap-
ter introduces the book, the next five chapters 
deal with U.S. states, the seventh chapter deals 
with the European Union, the eighth chapter 
with Germany, the ninth and tenth chapters with 
Spain, and the last chapter with Canada. 
A key strength of the book is its comparative 
perspective. The credibility revolution in empiri-
cal economics increased the academic studies 
focused on a single country because it’s typically 
easier to find exogenous variations in policies in a 
within-country setting. As a result, the ability to 
draw broader conclusions by looking at a single 
piece of research was diminished. This book aims 
at filling this gap, by offering a unified framework 
to interpret many case studies and providing much 
“food for thought” for academic economists in the 
fields of public finance, political economy, and 
macroeconomics. 
Subnational public finance has its own pecu-
liarities. It is well known, both in developing and 
developed economies, that local governments’ 
policies are typically less countercyclical than 
national ones (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Hines 
2010). Assuming that the ability to implement 
countercyclical fiscal policy is one of the ratio-
nales for allowing governments to run debts, 
this implies that subnational public debt may be, 
all else equal, more distortionary than national 
debt and, therefore, deserving of distinct aca-
demic investigation. Additionally, Peterson and 
Nadler are well aware that political distortions 
can explain the persistence and increase of public 
debt over time and underline in chapter 1 how 
the analysis of public debt can’t ignore political 
economy considerations. 
Consistent with this attention to political econ-
omy, several of the authors analyzed policies that 
were adopted by various states as a consequence 
of the increasing levels of subnational debts and 
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default risks across the globe. The most  common 
policy response has been to move towards cen-
tralization and away from federalism. This cen-
tralization response is especially frequent in 
Europe, both in the European Union and in 
specific countries (for instance, Germany and 
Spain). In contrast to this “centralization trend,” 
the main policy proposal of the book for the cur-
rent fiscal instability of many local governments 
around the world is to preserve and reinforce 
competitive federalism. This latter term is mainly 
defined in the second and third chapters of the 
book as a federalist system characterized by fis-
cally disciplinary, market-based forces combined 
with a commitment from the upper layers of gov-
ernments not to bail out lower layers. 
While the policy proposal is plausible, there are 
many challenges in its practical implementation, 
such as political and legal ones. From the political 
perspective, it may obviously be hard for national 
governments to not bail out subnational govern-
ments ex post, no matter how credible the com-
mitment is. From the legal perspective, as noted 
by Rodden in the third chapter, the rules of sub-
national defaults are often not clearly specified for 
market actors, hence, the risk of default increases 
even more the uncertainty of public creditors. 
Another challenge for competitive federalism 
is the potential lack of budget transparency. This 
is the main topic of the fourth and fifth chapters, 
which deal with public pension plans, and of the 
sixth chapter, which deals with high-risk invest-
ments by subnational governments. Unfunded 
pension and health care obligations have had an 
important role in the recent bankruptcies of several 
U.S. municipalities, and the size of these unfunded 
liabilities is highly dependent on the assumptions 
made when estimating them. In the sixth chapter, 
Shoag emphasizes how U.S. subnational govern-
ments rely on risky investments to finance them-
selves and how this can increase the frequency of 
bankruptcies in the future. Engaging in risky finan-
cial investments is not peculiar to U.S. subnational 
governments: for instance, several Italian cities 
signed complex derivatives contracts, whose effect 
on public accounts was delayed over time and often 
generated lawsuits between local governments and 
investment banks (Bloomberg 2009). 
Two important topics that would have prob-
ably deserved more attention are individual 
mobility and fiscal rules. First, making indi-
vidual mobility easier may be, in my opinion, 
a policy that may increase competitive pres-
sure on subnational governments. Consistent 
with this point, I believe the lack of individual 
mobility within the European Union is one of 
the reasons that competitive federalism may 
be difficult to quickly achieve among the EU 
countries. Second, fiscal rules are laws designed 
to increase the incentives for fiscal discipline 
and are increasingly common across the globe, 
especially when imposed by national govern-
ments on subnational ones. 
In spite of all of the aforementioned challenges, 
competitive federalism has survived for many 
decades in the United States, as Rodden argues 
in the third chapter, and still survives in Canada, 
as Simeon, Pearce, and Nugent argue in the last 
chapter of the book. In this last chapter, the 
authors try to identify the reasons that explain 
the success of a competitive federalist system. 
Although such an identification process is hard, 
the authors argue that the strength of legal and 
political institutions can have an important role, 
by making coordination among different layers of 
government easy and by facilitating compromises 
across different preferences on the level of gov-
ernment interventions in the economy. 
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Tax policy has been central to economists’ raison 
d’être since they first evolved from moral philos-
ophers. Our core theories of taxation—pioneered 
by Frank P. Ramsey, Arnold C. Harberger, James 
Mirrlees, and others—provide deep economic 
insights involving incidence, excess burden, and 
optimal rate structures, which balance objec-
tives of equity and efficiency. Yet, if one were 
to ask most ordinary citizens what they think of 
the “excess burden” of taxes, they would evoke 
painful tax forms and audits, and look puzzlingly 
at our odd triangles. If asked how they might 
respond to taxes, many would bring up various 
avoidance “loopholes,” rather than how much to 
work and save. Economists’ core theories also do 
little to enlighten tax experts in other fields—
such as law, accounting, or administration—
interested in issues like how to define tax bases, 
relay tax information, and enforce compliance. 
Moreover, the core theories do not predict exist-
ing tax structures with features such as low, flat-
rate taxes on consumption. They do even worse 
with past structures, which included particular 
taxes on salt, chimneys, and windows.
Unbeknownst to many, economists have 
extended economic reasoning to a much wider 
array of tax issues for decades. Perhaps best 
known is the work of Michael Allingham and 
Agnar Sandmo, who applied Becker’s theory 
of amoral criminal behavior to tax avoidance, 
pointing out that imperfect enforcement adds 
a hidden welfare cost to taxes through uncer-
tainty. Yet, not until Tax Systems have hard-won 
insights on these broader issues been synthe-
sized succinctly and rigorously in a far-reaching 
monograph. There is no more qualified author 
than Joel Slemrod. He has spent over thirty-five 
years working on these issues, trained legions 
of tax economists, gained tremendous respect 
from tax experts across disciplines, and person-
ally authored or coauthored over fifty of the 350 
articles and books covered in Tax Systems. The 
notes of his intellectually rich graduate course 
on taxation provided the backbone of this book. 
Faced with many other pressing duties, Slemrod 
enlisted one of his best students, Christian 
Gillitzer, to coauthor this text.
After explaining its purpose, the book briefly 
reviews a succinct form of optimal tax theory, 
helpful for later chapters. It nicely generalizes 
how differentiated optimal tax rates equally 
balance “behavioral” and “mechanical” (i.e., 
 revenue-raising) responses across rates. 
The second section discusses less standard 
components of tax systems, starting with alterna-
tive behavioral responses. Taxpayers may illegally 
evade taxes by underreporting income and risk-
ing punishment, or legally avoid taxes through 
costly sheltering efforts that otherwise do not 
affect consumption (except through income 
effects). The next chapter explains administrative 
and compliance costs, responsible for an entire 
industry of tax preparers and much of the public’s 
distaste for the tax code. In a discursive but infor-
mative chapter, the authors consider multiple 
nonstandard tax instruments, such as withhold-
ing, and information collection and distribution. 
A take-away from this section is that the things 
governments tax may be rather different from the 
things taxpayers ultimately care about. One con-
sequence is that workers may respond to a tax cut 
very differently than to a wage hike of the same 
nominal value, violating a common restriction 
made in theoretical and applied work.
The third section puts these nonstandard 
instruments and elements together into a gener-
alized “optimal tax systems” model. The upshot 
is that nonstandard instruments, however dif-
ficult they may be to quantify, should balance 
behavioral and mechanical responses in the 
same way as tax rates. These formulae must also 
factor in marginal changes in administrative and 
compliance costs, with the former being more 
onerous, as they are paid out of tax revenues. The 
rest of the section covers optimal tax bases and 
endogenous elasticities. An important point for 
optimal taxation is that those who appear poor 
on their tax returns may just have better avoid-
ance opportunities, or be prone to measurement 
problems, blunting the case for redistributive 
taxation. 
The authors dispel numerous myths about 
tax systems, including the so-called “remittance 
invariance theorem.” In real-world tax systems, 
how tax payments (and information) are remit-
ted does influence revenue collection and the 
after-tax prices faced by buyers and sellers. When 
England first made firms remit income taxes dur-
ing the Napoleonic Wars, it doubled revenues, 
possibly changing the course of world history. 
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Milton Friedman expressed regret for irreversibly 
“ratcheting” up the size of the U.S. government 
by setting up its remittance infrastructure during 
World War II. Remittance and  third-party report-
ing also explains why self-employed workers 
report spending over a third more of their ostensi-
ble incomes on food and charity than other work-
ers with the same purported income; it has little to 
do with hunger or charity. These and many other 
issues should help the reader to realize that the 
general theory of tax systems is not small potatoes. 
The book’s coverage is broad yet concise, its 
writing is well-crafted and edited, and its discus-
sions are lively and informed. We learn on page 
106 that informative mailings “with a simplified 
layout and less repetition” get better responses 
from readers. The same is true for books, and this 
one is not completely free of first-edition imper-
fections. The book could be made even more 
readable through some minor reorganization and 
streamlining, particularly with the formal mod-
els. I thoroughly enjoyed the chapter on the tax 
base elasticity, which explains how both standard 
and nonstandard responses to taxes contribute 
equally on the margin to the excess burden of 
taxation. Yet, I was unsure why this chapter was 
sandwiched in the second section, as the third 
of four chapters. It contained formal results on 
 tax-evasion engendered risk that might have 
belonged two chapters earlier. 
The book is not short on mathematical models, 
and is best read by those with formal graduate 
training in economics. Not much background in 
public finance is required. It could be used as a 
standalone textbook, although if I were to teach 
a semester-long course on taxation, I would com-
plement it with Bernard Salanie’s Economics of 
Taxation. 
Every public economist should learn the lessons 
covered by Tax Systems. These lessons would also 
be very useful to development economists and 
economic historians trying to make sense of the 
public sector, or to any economist trying to make 
sense of noneconomists’ reactions to Tax Day. 
Reading Slemrod and Gillitzer’s book may just be 
the most efficient, and possibly equitable, way to 
learn those lessons.
David Albouy
Department of Economics, 
University of Illinois
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Cambridge and London: Harvard University 
Press, 2013. Pp. ix, 380. $29.95. ISBN 978–0–
674–72508–9. JEL 2014–0188
Among economists, Richard Posner is best 
known as a member of the Chicago School and 
a founding father of Law and Economics. Posner 
is a prolific scholar. He has written or edited 
more than forty books and authored more than 
four hundred articles. He is the most cited legal 
scholar of all time (Shapiro 2000b), and his semi-
nal treatise Economic Analysis of Law, first 
published in 1973 and now in its ninth edition 
(Posner 2014), is among the most cited legal texts 
published in recent decades (Shapiro 2000a).
Posner has amazingly done much of his aca-
demic writing “on the side.” Since 1981, his day 
job has been as a federal judge on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Posner has 
been equally productive as a federal appellate 
judge. By his own account, Posner has heard 
oral argument in more than six thousand cases, 
read many more than fifteen thousand briefs, and 
written more than 2,800 published judicial opin-
ions (p. 2).
In his most recent book, Reflections on 
Judging, Posner reflects on his experience as a 
federal appellate judge. Posner offers his (strong) 
opinions on a litany of subjects, including how 
appellate judges should decide cases, write opin-
ions, and manage their staffs; how appellate law-
yers should brief and argue cases; how to improve 
the trial process in the federal courts; and how 
federal judges should be selected and trained.
For the most part, Posner’s reflections amount 
to a critique of the federal judiciary. Posner’s main 
concern is that federal judges are not coping well 
with the increasing complexity of federal cases, 
the primary sources of which are external to the 
law and the legal system (e.g., scientific and tech-
nological progress). Rather than taking a prag-
matic, realist approach to judging and grappling 
head-on with the challenge of rising external 
complexity, Posner bewails, many judges retreat 
to legal formalism and obfuscate their avoidance 
by needlessly complicating the law and the legal 
process. “They escape from [external] complexity 
into [internal] complexity” (p. 14).
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Many of the particulars of Posner’s critique 
are mundane (though oftentimes colorful). For 
instance, he complains that the “staff allocation 
in the judiciary is proportional not to need but 
to rank” (pp. 51–2). He denounces the 511-page 
Bluebook, the leading manual of legal citation, 
as a hypertrophic absurdity and decries judges’ 
sheepish adherence to its byzantine rules. He 
laments judicial timidity about conducting 
Internet research, relying on visual material 
(diagrams, graphs, maps, photographs, and the 
like), and utilizing court-appointed expert wit-
nesses in adjudicating cases. He criticizes the 
widespread practice of delegating opinion writ-
ing to law clerks, arguing that it is inefficient and 
engenders formalist opinions. And he bemoans 
the paucity and content of judicial training, both 
initial and continuing, warning that judges are 
“falling behind” (p. 351) and urging the Federal 
Judicial Center (the education and research 
agency for the federal courts) and the legal acad-
emy to do more to better equip federal judges 
to manage and adjudicate increasingly complex 
matters.
Other aspects of Posner’s critique are more 
high-minded. For example, he ponders the com-
plexities of federal criminal sentencing, con-
cluding that it should be “evidence-based, not 
emotion-based or intuitive” (p. 70) and chas-
tising the federal judiciary for “ignoring scien-
tific and social scientific research” on the social 
benefits and costs of imprisonment (though he 
acknowledges an absence of consensus, both 
normative and empirical, on many aspects of the 
social welfare analysis) (pp. 67–8). He thought-
fully considers the role of the jury in federal 
trials and the ways that judges instruct them, 
fretting once more about judicial ignorance of 
the “immense social-scientific literature” on the 
subject (p. 301). He eruditely discusses at great 
length the jurisprudential subjects of judicial 
self-restraint and statutory interpretation, dis-
missing most forms of the former as formal-
ist escapes from dealing with complexity (the 
exception being James Bradley Thayer’s the-
ory of constitutional constraint, which Posner 
extols as realist) and excoriating two theories 
of the latter—Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
Garner’s version of textual originalism, again 
as a formalist escape route, and Akhil Amar’s 
 theory of the unwritten Constitution, as an 
unprincipled (albeit not formalist) escape from 
the strictures of empirical reality. And he skew-
ers civil recourse theory, a noninstrumental 
account of tort law expounded by John Goldberg 
and Benjamin Zipursky, as “antimodern” and 
“antirealist” (p. 358) and an illustration of a kind 
of “hermetic legal scholarship that cannot help 
lawyers and judges to master the complexity of 
modernity as it impinges on the law” (p. 366).
Although Posner discusses a number of modest 
proposals for reform, he fails to address long-stand-
ing calls for the imposition of a mandatory retire-
ment age (e.g., Major 1966) or term limits (e.g., 
Cramton and Carrington 2006) for federal judges. 
This is a glaring omission in light of two facts. First, 
Posner acknowledges that part of the problem is 
that the federal judiciary is aging (due to the combi-
nation of life tenure and increasing life expectancy). 
Elaborating on his statement that judges are falling 
behind, Posner explains: “The problem is not case-
load; it is case content. Judges aren’t coping well 
with the increased complexity, mainly but not only 
scientific and technological, of modern society. . . . 
[W]e judges are not inhabiting this new world com-
fortably” (p. 351). Why? In part, it is because “many 
federal judges serve into their seventies and eight-
ies and occasionally beyond, and elderly judges are 
likely to find today’s rapid pace of technological 
advance particularly difficult to keep up with” (p. 
346). Second, Posner has written previously on the 
subjects of aging judges (Posner 1995) and term 
limits (Posner 2008), and has plainly rejected the 
argument that the former justifies the latter. Yet in 
these prior writings, Posner did not consider the 
challenge of rising complexity. And so we are left 
wondering how or whether Posner would reconcile 
or change his position.1
1 In fact, several parts of the book are repurposed mate-
rial from Posner’s prior extrajudicial writings. Although I 
agree with other reviewers that the stitching together of 
this material is not “uniformly successful” (Walsh 2014) 
and that the “seams occasionally do show” (Orthofer 
2013), I also agree that the way this prior material is inte-
grated into the book is valuable in that it “reveals Posner’s 
understanding of the overall coherence of these extraju-
dicial writings” (Walsh 2013) in terms of the challenge of 
rising complexity. There would have been an equivalent 
benefit to Posner revisiting his prior extrajudicial writ-
ings on aging judges and term limits in the context of the 
book’s unifying theme of complexity.
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All in all, Reflections on Judging is a worthwhile 
read for economists with an interest in the law 
and the federal judiciary. I also recommend it to 
economists with an interest in Richard Posner in 
his capacity as a federal judge. Indeed, the book 
is quite personal—Posner frequently draws on his 
own experience as a judge, and the book opens 
(after an introduction) with an autobiographical 
chapter in which Posner recounts his path 
to the federal bench, including his higher 
education (Yale, then Harvard Law School), his 
early career as a lawyer (Supreme Court clerk 
to Justice Brennan, then stints at the Federal 
Trade Commission, Solicitor General’s Office, 
and President’s Task Force on Communications 
Policy) and as a law professor (Stanford for one 
year, then Chicago for life), and his appointment 
by President Reagan and Senate confirmation 
to the Seventh Circuit. However, I would not 
recommend the book to economists who are 
interested in Richard Posner solely as a law and 
economics scholar. Reflections is a book about the 
practice of judging, not about the economics of 
law.
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If all the solutions to online security flaws were 
laid end to end, they would add up to a com-
plete removal of privacy. Of course, an extreme 
approach will not be adopted in most countries, 
and so online security remains one of the most 
vexing issues in electronic commerce today. 
And the need for solutions is urgent. Security 
issues infest almost every essential online activ-
ity today—electronic mail, video entertainment, 
electronic commerce, delivery of advertising, and 
more.
If there are no straightforward economic prin-
ciples that determine all choices about privacy 
and security, what should an economist think? 
It is time to think hard. Fortunately, that is true 
of this book. It contains thirteen chapters that 
survey the landscape of economic understand-
ing, and provide a taste of the directions taken by 
applied researchers on the frontiers of this issue. 
To be clear, not very much unites these chapters 
except a broad interest in economic approaches 
to these topics. Each chapter can be read inde-
pendently of the others. A few chapters present 
grounded empirical research, while others pres-
ent simulations or behavioral theory. Every chap-
ter displays careful application of theory within 
the context of institutional constraints, and 
thoughtful measurement of statistical evidence. 
Chapter 12, “Measuring the Cost of 
Cybercrime,” was my favorite chapter. An eight- 
author team builds on a study done for the 
UK government and estimates the losses from 
cybercrime. This estimate goes over broad ter-
ritory—phishing, malware, copyright infringe-
ment, identity theft, online payment fraud, and 
all the defensive expenses affiliated with clean-
ing up this mess. The goal seems problematic 
from the outset: how could they possibly esti-
mate a specific number with any reliability? Yet, 
the exercise requires and displays a lot of judg-
ment (and courage), as it tries to get the order of 
magnitude in the right ballpark. Sure, there is 
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room for  improvement, but now every researcher 
has a framework to follow, as well as a baseline 
estimate.
 Another favorite was the study by Neuhaus and 
Plattner of security fixes in several large software 
programs, such as Apache httpd. They frame a 
research agenda at the intersection of models 
and phenomenon. For example, as with any other 
investment, they expect diminishing returns to 
investing in security flaws. Yet, they do not find 
evidence of it. They also look for evidence that 
security software improves as part of engaging in 
an arms race, and, again, do not find what they 
expect. This is analytical social science at an early 
moment in an industry. Is there room for more 
conversation between modeling and statistical 
testing? Sure, but once again, the chapter lays out 
a good baseline from which to start.
The conversation with models also gets an 
interesting test in the chapter by Kelley and 
Camp. They examine a deceptively simple policy 
question: How can some security issues, such as 
viruses, be handled with limited resources? Using 
modified epidemiological models, their simula-
tions suggest a public-goods approach to contain-
ing computer viruses, with targeted investment 
on some subpopulations. Once again, the chapter 
illustrates how modeling can play a useful role in 
framing policy options.
Three of the privacy papers are largely behav-
ioral in approach, designing experiments to fur-
ther understand user attitudes and responses 
to different privacy choices. It is a rich topic, 
because there seems to be a remarkable amount 
of variance in human attitudes about different 
dimensions of privacy. At the same time, it must 
be said that the literature on the economics of 
privacy is much bigger than the landscape sur-
veyed by these three papers. Of the three, I best 
liked the experiments examining user willingness 
or reluctance to provide deeply personal informa-
tion, such as a death in the family. As the experi-
ment shows, many people resist talking about 
such topics, but some will do it if prompted in the 
right way. 
Readers with a theoretical bent also have a few 
papers to choose from. My favorite was the paper 
by Demetz and Bachlechner, which examines 
principles for organizations making investments 
in security, which is a foundational question. It 
harkens back to a familiar theme; the absence of 
any sweeping principle from which to address all 
questions. They show the range of approaches 
taken by researchers, and identify the strengths 
and weaknesses of each. This is as close to a sur-
vey as any of the chapters get, albeit, the empha-
sis is on a question that has not been settled. 
The book has more chapters than reviewed 
here, and different chapters will appeal to dif-
ferent readers. That is indicative of the state of 
economic research about security and privacy 
today. It is too soon to declare victory over many 
fundamental questions. This is not a topic that 
has yet refined its way to an accepted set of gen-
eral lessons, so there is plenty of opportunity for 
more research. In that sense, this book is a good 
start for a researcher with an interest in economic 
approaches to online security issues. 
Shane Greenstein
Northwestern University
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The bankrupt Pennsylvania Railroad merged 
with the New York Central Railroad on February 
1, 1968 to form Penn Central. In 872 days, Penn 
Central filed for bankruptcy protection. How did 
this happen? What was the impact of government 
regulation of the railroad industry, which started 
in 1887 with the establishment of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission? Why was the railroad 
industry in dire financial straits through most of 
the twentieth century, but thriving today? Why 
was the railroad industry eager to turn over pas-
senger service to the newly formed AMTRAK? 
How did the railroad industry get where it is 
today and where is it headed the future? The 
answers to these and other questions are con-
tained in the book American Railroads: Decline 
and Renaissance in the Twentieth Century by 
Robert Gallamore and John Meyer. 
John Meyer was a long time Harvard professor 
who passed away before the book was completed. 
He was Gallamore’s Ph.D. advisor at Harvard. 
Gallamore served in a variety of positions in the 
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railroad industry, government, and academia. 
The idea for the book came from Meyer, who 
realized there are books about the nineteenth-
century railroads, but none about the twentieth. 
This book is designed to fill that gap. It is a mix-
ture of railroad history, the economics of govern-
ment regulation, public policy analysis, and rail 
costing and pricing. It is not only about railroads, 
but about the economic history of the United 
States. They note in the first chapter, “[a] central 
theme of this book is that railroads, throughout 
their history, were so important to the U.S. econ-
omy that politicians could not leave them alone, 
and when governments did intervene in trans-
portation markets, they usually made a mess of 
things” (p. 17).
The book begins with a primer on the econom-
ics of transportation, government regulation, and 
pricing. This chapter is written so as to make 
economics accessible to noneconomists. This 
includes a discussion of natural monopoly, cost-
based and demand-based rates, value of service 
ratemaking, elasticity of demand, Ramsey pric-
ing, and the authors’ ten principles of transporta-
tion economics. 
Public policy in the first half of the twentieth 
century is the subject of chapter three. The early 
part of the century featured attempts to combine 
railroads into more efficient and effective enter-
prises. These combinations were opposed by 
President Theodore Roosevelt in the trust bust-
ing era, and found illegal by the Supreme Court. 
Towards the end of the century, these same 
mergers were implemented and resulted in the 
creation of the BNSF and UPSP systems. 
The railroad industry was taken over by the 
federal government during World War I. After 
the war, the railroads were given back to private 
hands through the Transportation Act of 1920. 
However, stringent regulation of the railroads 
continued. There were attempts to consolidate 
strong railroads with weak ones in the hopes of 
rate equalization and other goals. But, most of 
these attempts resulted in failure. Gallamore 
and Meyer show how the lessons from yesteryear 
can be applied to issues today, such as the debate 
between consolidation and regulation versus 
competition in pricing. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
railroads held a monopoly over long distance 
passenger service, with few exceptions. By 1970, 
passenger service was a not only losing money, 
but had deteriorated to such an extent that it 
was no more the elegant transportation mode as 
it once was. No more were the Hollywood stars 
long distance rail passengers. No more movies 
like “North by Northwest,” which featured the 
New York Central’s Twentieth Century Limited 
service from New York to Chicago. The book 
highlights the factors causing the decline of pri-
vate rail passenger service and the creation of 
AMTRAK. The authors cite ICC regulation, the 
growth in alternative modes, which were heavily 
subsidized, the mix of freight and passenger ser-
vice on the same lines, and public policy, which 
favored the airline industry. 
Parallel versus end-to-end mergers are the 
subject of chapter 6. In the middle of the cen-
tury, the ICC was more willing to approve paral-
lel than end-to-end mergers. The authors argue 
that parallel mergers sought to achieve substan-
tial cost economies, while end-to-end mergers 
were designed to facilitate improved service. 
The Penn Central disaster was a parallel merger 
that ended up in the nationalization of rail ser-
vice in the Northeast and the creation of Conrail 
out of the ashes. Many factors contributed to the 
demise of the Penn Central and other Northeast 
railroads. The book goes into detail explaining 
each of these. In addition, there are a variety 
of case studies of railroad mergers in the mid-
twentieth century with detailed descriptions of 
the genealogy of each. How did public policy 
react to the rail bankruptcies of the 1970s? What 
role did the federal government play in helping 
or impeding change? The book addresses many 
of the public policy issues and how sometimes 
government got it right, and most of the time did 
not.
One public policy that government got right is 
deregulation. This started with the 3R Act, then 
the 4R Act and then the Staggers Rail Act of 
1980, which had a massive impact on the industry. 
Deregulation culminated in the ICC Elimination 
Act, in which the ICC was replaced by the Surface 
Transportation Board—or STB—with substan-
tially diminished regulatory power. Gallamore 
worked in government when much of this legis-
lation was passed and gives a firsthand account 
of the debates that took place in Congressional 
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hearings and the discussions in and out of govern-
ment on the merits of deregulation. 
In the concluding chapter of the over 500-
page book, entitled “Decline and Renaissance of 
American Railroads in the Twentieth Century” 
the authors provide a summary of the history of 
the railroads and the lessons for public policy in 
the future. This chapter is such a great summary, 
that the reader may be best off starting with it, 
before reading the book. But don’t forget the 
afterword, which provides the authors’ recom-
mendations for future U.S. policies for the rail-
roads. It is a very insightful chapter.
It is difficult to be critical of such an excel-
lent work, which is very through and impeccably 
referenced throughout. The errors are ones of 
omission rather than commission. For example, 
Gabriel Kolko has developed a very different the-
sis of government regulation from the authors’ 
public interest gone amuck theory. They briefly 
mention Kolko in two chapters of the book, 
but never discuss why they feel Kolko is wrong. 
Second, there is no discussion of short line and 
regional railroads which grew in importance 
after deregulation. It would be helpful to read 
the authors’ analysis as to why these railroads are 
doing well, while the Class I railroads could not 
make money on these routes. Third, there seems 
to be a growing interest in high-speed rail in the 
United States. Can such service ever break even? 
What are the economics of high speed rail? Short 
lines and high-speed rail would make an excel-
lent sequel to American Railroads. I hope Bob 
Gallamore will consider coming out of retirement 
to write such a book.
American Railroads should be on the reading 
list of economists interested in transportation and 
logistics, economic historians, government offi-
cials, and rail fans who would like to know more 
about the history of the railroads in the twenti-
eth century, and are interested in understanding 
the economics of the industry and the problems 
of government regulation. Gallamore and Meyer, 
at the end of the book, sum up why it should be 
read: 
This book’s authors love railroads because 
they have a great history, fascinating opera-
tions, intriguing technology and untold 
opportunity for the future, but we also love 
them because no other enterprises illustrate 
elegant economic principles quite so well 
(p. 435).
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Baseball on Trial is the first full-length treat-
ment of the antitrust suits brought by the Federal 
League and the Baltimore Terrapins against 
Organized Baseball (the former name of Major 
League Baseball) during 1915–22. Grow’s narra-
tive is detailed, entertaining, and smart. I am not 
sure, however, that he has unlocked the secret 
to judicial missteps over the last twenty years, or 
that he truly vindicated the Taft Supreme Court 
of 1922, as he purports to have done.
The basic story is as follows. The Federal League 
(FL) was founded in 1913 as a minor league. At the 
end of its first season, the FL announced that it 
would seek major-league stars and expand play in 
eastern cities. That is, it would attempt to become 
a competitive rival to Organized Baseball. Over 
the next two years, thanks to higher salaries, the 
FL induced eighty-one major leaguers to jump 
to the fledgling league. Labor market competi-
tion led to a spike in the average salary of major 
leaguers from $3,800 in 1913 to $7,300 in 1915. 
The salary wars led to losses in both leagues, with 
larger losses in the FL. 
Meanwhile, Organized Baseball was threat-
ening those players who jumped to the FL with 
blacklisting. It also sought injunctions in court 
to prevent players from jumping. The flounder-
ing FL’s only hope was to bring antitrust litiga-
tion against Organized Baseball, which it did in 
January 1915. The case was in Chicago in the 
courtroom of Kenesaw Mountain Landis, base-
ball’s subsequent commissioner. Landis sat on the 
case for a year, issuing no decision and leading to 
a settlement between the two parties. The settle-
ment paid the FL owners $600,000 and allowed 
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two FL owners to buy into National or American 
League clubs.
The FL’s Baltimore Terrapins, however, were 
virtually excluded from the benefits of the settle-
ment. Organized Baseball eventually offered 
Terrapins’ owners a $50,000 buyout, but they 
rejected it and filed an antitrust suit in 1916. 
The Terrapins won an $80,000 award (tripled to 
$240,000) plus expenses in trial court, but lost 
on appeal before the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals in April 1921. In May 1922, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, headed by former president 
William Howard Taft, in a decision written by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., upheld the appeals 
court decision, holding that baseball was “a purely 
state affair,” neither involved in commerce, nor 
interstate in its basic nature. Hence, Organized 
Baseball was immune to both the Sherman and 
Clayton Antitrust Acts.
Many books, of course, have told this story. 
Baseball on Trial distinguishes itself by taking 
the reader inside the courtroom and giving a 
blow-by-blow account of the legal strategies, the 
arguments, and the characters involved. Grow’s 
account is not only engrossing, it is edifying.
Grow emphasizes the gravamen that ultimately 
formed the basis of both the DC Court of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court—that baseball did not 
constitute interstate commerce. Grow claims that 
previous baseball historians have been unfair to 
the Taft court. He asserts that the conception 
of interstate commerce at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was much narrower than it is 
today. To wit, Grow claims, as have others, that 
the conception of commerce in 1920 included 
only tangible goods, not services, and he points 
to a few court cases, such as Metropolitan Opera 
Co. v. Hammerstein, that sustain this view.
While others, including myself, have acknowl-
edged this narrower and more ambiguous con-
ception of interstate commerce, Grow goes a step 
further and vindicates the Taft court on this basis. 
I think here Grow overstates the case. First, there 
were other cases where the interpretation pointed 
to a broader conception of interstate commerce; 
and second, Grow’s position minimizes an endur-
ing tendency of the Supreme Court (and other 
courts) to find legal precedent to justify a decision 
that it wanted to make for political, philosophical, 
or personal reasons. 
In the case of William Howard Taft, there was 
good reason to believe that his participation in 
the decision was heavily compromised: Taft’s half 
brother was the former owner of the Chicago 
Cubs, who sold the team as part of the settlement 
with the FL; Taft was approached by Organized 
Baseball in 1918 to see if he would be interested in 
becoming the head of the sport‘s governing body; 
the American and National Leagues each sent 
the chief justice a season’s pass to all games for 
the 1922 season, just weeks before the Terrapin’s 
appeal was heard; and Taft was a longtime asso-
ciate of George Pepper, who was baseball’s lead 
counsel, and whom Taft had offered a seat on 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals while he was 
president. Taft did not recuse himself from the 
case. Other justices had similar prior leanings.
Even for 1922, there was plenty of evidence 
and precedent to establish the business of base-
ball as participating in interstate commerce. 
Organized baseball received payments from 
equipment manufacturers to use their products. 
It received payments from Western Union for 
the right to transmit game scores over the wires. 
The 1921 World Series was broadcast over a radio 
relay from the Polo Grounds in Manhattan via 
KDKA (Pittsburgh), WBZ (Springfield), and WJZ 
(Newark). Even if the games, which involved half 
the players crossing state lines, were “purely state 
affairs,” the business of baseball involved tangible 
goods that were sold on an interstate basis.
To be sure, Grow is a sophisticated analyst and 
he gives play to these arguments. He just seems 
to discount them in backing the Taft court. I have 
other differences with Grow’s analysis, but they 
are minor. 
The book should be read by those seeking to 
understand the origin and dimensions of base-
ball’s antitrust immunity, and by any jurists who 
may be deliberating on this issue in the future.
Andrew Zimbalist
Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics, 
 Smith College
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In The People’s Network: The Political 
Economy of the Telephone in the Gilded Age, 
Robert MacDougall argues that AT&T’s boun-
teous corporate archives have led scholars to 
tell the history of the telephone from an AT&T-
centric perspective. MacDougall’s history of 
the Independents, a movement that provided a 
robust alternative to AT&T in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, aims to widen the 
range of analysis in the literature. This is not a 
book for those interested in a comprehensive 
examination of the industrial organization of the 
Independents, nor does it provide a systematic 
overview of the changing regulatory environ-
ment in which the telephone operated. Instead, 
MacDougall weaves a narrative of the cultural, 
political, and commercial forces that shaped the 
development of the industry in the United States 
and Canada. MacDougall dismisses the idea that 
technology primarily determined the develop-
ment of the telephone industry, instead arguing 
that its organization was “politically constructed,” 
with “political institutions” providing “the envi-
ronments in which individual actors had to fight 
for their interests and plans” (p. 175). The organi-
zation of the telephone network raised questions 
of “independence, interconnection, and scale” 
that reflected “arguments about the way the 
country ought to be organized” (p. 17).
MacDougall presents three alternative visions 
of how and by whom the telephone should be 
used, each of which was held by an early leader 
at Bell Telephone. Gardiner Hubbard, Bell’s first 
president and subsequent advocate for reform, 
proposed a “telephone for the people” that was 
simple to use and locally owned. This vision 
helped to shape “a decentralized network of local 
and regional systems” that used Bell’s technolo-
gies (p. 71). Hubbard mistrusted Western Union’s 
size and political influence and thought the tele-
phone would provide a “democratic good” to off-
set it. William Forbes, Bell’s second president, 
had a conservative vision of the telephone that 
focused on rich customers and steady profits. His 
vision pushed Bell to provide high-quality ser-
vice to a limited customer base. The third vision 
of “One System, One Policy, Universal Service” 
was advocated (somewhat retrospectively) by 
Theodore Vail, AT&T’s first president. This vision 
of a single national network later became an 
important part of AT&T’s public relations cam-
paign to win back business and influence legisla-
tion that would reestablish its national monopoly.
At the heart of MacDougall’s book is a com-
parison of the telephone networks in the United 
States and Canada. He uses two cities, Muncie, 
Indiana, and Kingston, Ontario, to illustrate dif-
ferences in regulation, industrial organization, 
and telephone culture. The sociologists Robert 
and Helen Lynd studied Muncie in the 1920s 
and 1930s, dubbing it “Middletown” to reflect 
its ordinariness. Although Muncie and Kingston 
were similarly ordinary in many respects, tele-
phone usage was not. In 1905, near the height of 
the Independent Telephone Movement, Indiana 
had one telephone for every twelve people, while 
Ontario only had one telephone for every ninety 
people. Indiana had over 1,000 independent tele-
phone systems in 1907, while Bell Canada was a 
monopolist in every major urban center in Ontario 
in 1910. Deep differences in telephone culture 
also existed. In Ontario, the telephone was used 
primarily by upper class men doing business, 
while the independent telephone in Indiana was 
also used by women and children and for social 
purposes. “A Muncie farm girl in the early 1900s 
might have giggled for hours on the telephone, 
then got off the line to let the neighbors hear her 
father play his banjo for a spell” (p. 264). Bell 
Canada and AT&T charged for measured service 
while Independents charged flat rates. These dif-
ferences reflected differences in regional cultures 
and regulation.
The history of the telephone in both Canada 
and the United States takes many unexpected 
turns. When Bell Canada’s patent monopoly 
expired in 1885, it successfully sidestepped com-
petition by petitioning the national government to 
amend its charter to declare Bell “a work for the 
general advantage of Canada,” giving “the com-
pany virtual immunity from both private compe-
tition and municipal reform” (p. 177). Yet regional 
politics and discontent with Bell Canada’s service 
led to “the bumblebee of communications,” seven 
regional monopolies that interconnected with 
local operating systems to create a national net-
work. It should not have been able to fly, claimed 
Bell engineers, but it did, offering an alternative 
to the centralized AT&T system. In the United 
States, a Bell monopoly turned into a competitive 
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landscape with “over thirty-two thousand active 
telephone companies outside of Bell’s control” 
(p. 110). Regulation rose from the municipal to 
the state and finally to the federal level, and as 
it did, the vision of the “telegraph for the peo-
ple” lost ground while that of a national network 
gained. By World War I, “natural monopoly” 
rhetoric was gospel. A brief stint of nationaliza-
tion served to solidify AT&T’s position, and the 
once important Independents became a “protec-
tive fringe” around AT&T’s monopoly position.
Was it “economies of scale” or “politics of scale” 
that ultimately determined the organization of 
the telephone industries in the United States and 
Canada? MacDougall contends that “Telephone 
monopoly in Canada was never truly ‘natural’; 
telephone competition in the Midwest was never 
truly ‘free.’ Both were political outcomes, estab-
lished and maintained by regulation and litiga-
tion” (p. 130). He makes a convincing case that the 
three distinct visions of the telephone—as a social 
and democratic tool for the people, as catering to 
business, or as a unified national network—played 
differently in different political cultures, helping 
to shape the organization of the industry and the 
uses to which the telephone was put.
Tomas Nonnenmacher
Department of Economics, 
Allegheny College
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In contrast to most social science research, 
anthropology considers the full range of human 
social systems, and looks deep in time, using 
archaeology to probe social and economic pro-
cesses beyond the reach of historical records. In 
light of the increased focus on the political econ-
omy of inequality in academic, policy, and activ-
ist circles, an examination of the origins of, and 
cross-cultural variation in, inequality is timely. 
Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus (hereafter, 
F&M) are both eminent archaeologists, each with 
a lifetime of research in many settings; here, they 
are clearly writing for the general reader. The 
volume ranges globally, and over the full span of 
our species’ history (nearly 200,000 years), but 
with an emphasis on the last few millennia, when 
most social complexity and inequality arose and 
spread. The prose is clear, even folksy at times, 
and generally free of specialist terminology. 
There are many line drawings (of archaeological 
sites and artifacts), but no tables or graphs, let 
alone equations, and the few numbers are mostly 
dates, population sizes, or site dimensions. The 
bibliographic notes are copious and indicate wide 
familiarity with archaeological and ethnographic 
literature on particular societies; citations to the 
theoretical or analytical literature are much more 
selective, even idiosyncratic (on which more, 
below).
F&M aim to take stock of what we have learned 
since Jean-Jacques Rousseau penned his famous 
Discourse on the origin of inequality in 1753. 
They draw on the two main branches of anthropol-
ogy, ethnography and archaeology, utilizing their 
relative strengths—archaeology for  long-term 
change and material evidence, ethnography for 
detailed descriptions of functioning societies, 
including their ideologies. Like Rousseau, F&M 
prefer to focus on flesh-and-blood actors strug-
gling to impose or resist systems of inequality. 
The book title itself heralds this focus: “creation” 
rather than “emergence” or “evolution,” imply-
ing the priority of agency (conscious change) in 
explaining the origins or causes of inequality. 
This focus is both a strength and a limitation. 
As F&M note, “our earliest ancestors were all 
born equal, but the Ice Age had barely thawed 
when some of them began surrendering bits of 
equality” (p. 547). Any explanation of this recur-
rent dynamic must address two striking puzzles:
1)  Why do the simplest human societies, 
small-scale foragers (hunter-gatherers) 
and horticulturalists (low-density, low-
capital farmers) lack systematic inequality 
based on dominance, given that the latter 
is found in all social vertebrates, including 
our primate relatives?
2)  How did such egalitarian societies persist 
for at least 180,000 years and spread all 
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over the globe, yet become unstable or 
vulnerable enough to evolve into or be 
replaced by the hierarchical systems that 
have prevailed in recent millennia?
F&M raise these questions, but do not satis-
factorily address them. This is due to their dis-
missive view of theory (beginning with their 
preface, where they compare theory to perfume 
that should just dabbed on lightly), as well as their 
view that changes in norms and ideologies—what 
F&M term “social logic”—are the main drivers in 
the emergence of systems of inequality. The result 
is an account that is full of rich details about how 
past societies were organized and changed over 
time, but very little attention to why this varia-
tion was patterned over time and space.
Noting correctly that the relatively recent and 
rapid emergence of systems of inequality “did not 
require genetic evolution,” they argue that this 
resulted from a change in “social logic” that can 
be analyzed using social anthropology. By impli-
cation, evolutionary biology is irrelevant, and even 
theory and findings of other social sciences (eco-
nomics, political science, sociology, game theory) 
are given almost no attention. Their approach is 
essentially inductive: describe multiple similar 
societies, summarize their commonalities, and 
derive a set of propositions that describe the 
“social logic” of these cases. Then do the same for 
another set of societies with increased inequality, 
and extract the changes in social logic needed to 
get from set A to set B.
As one example of a primordial social logic, 
F&M repeatedly cite the maxim “we were here 
first,” used by many groups to justify priority in 
land rights, kin group rankings, and the like. But 
they simply note it, attempting no explanation, 
and make no mention of the economic literature 
on property rights, nor evolutionary game theory 
models indicating that a convention of first-come 
first-served can outcompete either open access 
or fighting for every resource patch encountered, 
occupied or not (Maynard Smith and Parker 
1976; Gintis 2007). This is one of many examples 
of how F&M’s disciplinary provincialism and 
aversion to theorizing limit their ability to explain 
the patterns they so richly describe.
However, F&M cannot resist offering explana-
tions for some regularities, and reinvent  various 
theoretical wheels in doing so. For example, 
they chide unnamed scholars for characteriz-
ing hunter–gatherer land-sharing arrangements 
as “altruism” that might be genetically evolved, 
proposing instead that it might be “self-serving 
investment, a way of obligating their guests to 
host them in the future” in situations of locally 
fluctuating resources (p. 34). But the latter is pre-
cisely what various analyses have proposed (e.g., 
Smith and Boyd 1990), drawing on the Trivers 
(1971) model of “reciprocal altruism”—not really 
altruism at all, but rather delayed reciprocity, an 
iterated prisoners’ dilemma.
If there is a dominant explanatory thread in 
the book (beyond the question-begging appeals 
to shifts in social logic), it is the “dynamics of 
competitive interactions” (p. 473) as a driver of 
increased social complexity and inequality. In this, 
F&M stand with many who have researched the 
topic. According to F&M, the first steps towards 
social inequality arose when certain hunter–gath-
erers developed clan systems (social groupings 
larger and more permanent than extended fami-
lies, and based on real or fictive common descent). 
These clan systems created cooperative units that 
could outcompete less organized societies, either 
directly in warfare or indirectly in sharing food and 
information. F&M describe similar increases in 
scale (and resulting inequality) for later stages in 
social evolution (e.g., chiefdoms, states, empires). 
F&M note that “societies with agriculture and 
animal husbandry do seem to create more oppor-
tunities for inequality” (p. 67) but offer only cur-
sory attempts to explain how and why. Research 
showing that material wealth such as land and 
livestock is both more important to such societ-
ies, and more readily transmitted to offspring 
(Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009; Bowles, Smith, 
and Borgerhoff Mulder 2010) is perhaps over-
looked because of its recency, but older research 
addressing this question also goes unmentioned. 
F&M do provide cogent summaries of how cer-
tain hunter–gatherer groups in California and 
the Northwest Coast of America were able to 
build systems of inequality without agriculture, 
through control of trade or rich fishing grounds 
by a subset of the population. Yet even here they 
seem to privilege ideological factors over material 
ones, for example noting that Northwest Coast 
foragers like the Nootka exhibited a “ surprising...
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level of inequality” compared to other foragers, 
but “many principles of Nootka inequality could 
have been created out of the preexisting princi-
ples of egalitarian foraging society. All that would 
have been required were appropriate changes in 
social logic” (p. 74). Taking this statement at face 
value would imply that a Nootka-like system of 
hereditary aristocracy, commoners, and slaves 
with elaborate systems of property rights for the 
titleholders was within the reach of any foraging 
society that chose to make the requisite changes 
in social logic, a most dubious idea, given the 
antiquity and stability of egalitarian hunter–gath-
erer systems. When F&M do consider material 
wealth flows among Northwest Coast foragers, 
they favor an argument involving enslavement of 
debtors that is both illogical (why would debtors 
be more common in a setting they characterize 
as resource-abundant?) and at odds with known 
facts: as F&M note, slaves among Northwest 
Coast societies were war captives or offspring 
of same, not debtors. (They were also, we might 
add, important sources of labor power for sur-
plus production, as well as goods that could be 
traded or given as presents, or even destroyed in 
displays of conspicuous consumption.)
F&M are also quite dismissive of environmen-
tal drivers of social change. A striking example 
of this occurs in their discussion of Pueblo soci-
eties of the American Southwest; while noting 
the paleoclimatic evidence for drought coincid-
ing with the abandonment of many major Pueblo 
sites, they downplay its importance, speculating 
that “a long-standing desire for equal treatment... 
overcame hereditary privilege” (p. 160). But 
there is a mass of evidence that the century-long 
drought in question had region-wide effects on 
Pueblo abandonment, migration, warfare, and 
trade contraction; one need not be an environ-
mental determinist to give this factor its due. In 
another passage F&M argue that Peru is “a grave-
yard for theories of environmental determinism,” 
and cite the example of the Chavin chiefdom that 
inhabited a high-altitude, agriculturally unpro-
ductive valley—but then note in passing that this 
polity was strategically located “along a trade 
route linking the Pacific coast, the Andes, and 
the Amazon basin” and was thus “the midpoint 
for the long-distance movement of goods among 
three major cultural provinces” (pp. 246–47). 
In sum, F&M provide a very readable and 
well-informed summary of ethnographic and 
archaeological evidence on the variation in sys-
tems of inequality found in our species. The vol-
ume promises to address the key puzzle of why 
systems of inequality arose and spread only in 
the last 5–10 percent of our species’s history, but 
largely fails to do so. Fortunately, other research-
ers are making significant progress in this impor-
tant task; no doubt they will find the empirical 
information summarized and categorized in this 
volume very useful.
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López-Morell’s book is a very detailed, fine-
grained narrative of the workings and withdrawal 
of one of the most prominent international 
financial houses in Spain during a crucial and 
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often misunderstood period in the country’s his-
tory. The house arrived in Spain in the wake of 
Napoleon’s overthrowing of the Bourbon King 
in 1808, which triggered the institutional, politi-
cal, fiscal, and monetary turmoil that reigned 
in the country until 1856, at least. As the book 
shows well, the hundred-or-so years in which 
Rothschild was vested in Spain were consistently 
a time of protracted political and macroeconomic 
volatility. From the 1890s, the house started 
declining; it first lost its assets in railways with 
the nationalist drive of the 1920s and Primo de 
Rivera dictatorship—though the mining invest-
ments in Rio Tinto and Peñarroya survived well 
until the Great Depression.The fatal blow was the 
failure of its agent in Madrid in 1931—at a signifi-
cant loss—in the onset of the disturbances lead-
ing to the Civil War. By 1941, the Spanish branch 
of Rothschild was greatly diminished and hurried 
to leave the country, sharing the fate of the larger 
family inflicted by rising anti-Semitism in other 
European countries. Nevertheless, Rothschild 
managed to liquidate the remainder of their busi-
nesses without complete losses under Franco’s 
regime. 
The archival work behind the book is truly 
painstakingly done and the wealth of empirical 
information collected transpires in every page. 
There is a significant amount of relevant data in 
tables and graphs: although their presentation is 
far from ideal, in particular for purposes of com-
parison over time and across sectors (e.g., vari-
ous currencies, unclear indication of current or 
constant values, profits over the long run could 
be expressed as a proportion of GDP, etc). The 
translator has deftly dealt with the nuances in 
the grammar of Spanish language, and the book 
is quite readable despite the myriad of details, 
names, and events. Thus, a narrative too close to 
the domestic political developments may appear 
unnecessarily complicated for the unacquainted 
reader; instead a more general background on 
the fiscal and financial situation, the position 
of the treasury and the broad macroeconomic 
circumstances at different points would have 
shed a brighter light on the decisions that public 
officials and the house made. This would have 
made the arguments much more intelligible. 
Otherwise, claims such as those for the end of 
the businesses: the “failure in the generational 
take over” and “the rise of nationalism in Spain 
after World War I” had a somewhat ad hoc flavor, 
for instance. 
The first three chapters build on secondary lit-
erature and offer a broader, more coherent histori-
cal context than the rest of the book—admittedly 
more abundant scholarship published on the period 
1811–1855 has assisted the author in the task. The 
following seven chapters are the empirical core of 
the book; organized chronologically, they survey in 
minute detail the actual involvement of the house 
in the financing of government in times of war—
for which Rothschild secured the monopoly over 
quicksilver from the Almaden mines early in the 
1820s—the investment on railway construction, 
the continuous short-term lending to liberal gov-
ernments in the hectic environment of the 1860s, 
the more direct “industrial” investments after the 
1870s in the mining of pyrite (a critical input to 
produce sulphur), copper, and lead, and even the 
management of the royal family’s financial portfo-
lio. Sometimes there is far more on the participants 
than on policies, but introducing too many indi-
viduals and idiosyncratic ideological labels does 
not conceal almost identical fiscal and monetary 
policies among the different administrations, all 
of which characterizes the chronic public finance 
and currency messes of nineteenth-century Spain. 
However, these ill–defined features are the legacy 
of a political historiography that Spanish economic 
historians have so far been reluctant to take on. 
The last two chapters have a more comprehen-
sive analytical approach and reveal more on the 
Rothschild than on the politicos. Chapter 11 sums 
up the “fundamentals” of the house activities, 
although the analysis of the structure of decision 
making and of changes over time in the relative 
importance of different assets and investments in 
the Rothschild portfolio is a bit shallow and dis-
connected from changes in the economy, the busi-
nesses of the other branches in Europe, and the 
overall international economic environment. Some 
of these fundamentals deserved more attention, 
e.g., the control of the supply of quicksilver, vital 
for smelting gold and silver, ought to have helped 
the house to enjoy the upper hand in the arbitrage 
in bullion trade in European markets throughout 
the nineteeth century; similarly, the timing for the 
decisions to pull out from state financing and to 
move to direct investment in the 1870s could have 
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helped to distinguish changes and opportunities 
in the domestic environment. Chapter 12 does 
a long-run balance of the Rothschild years; in a 
very condensed fashion (pp. 386–404), it surveys 
the aggregate effects in the Spanish economy, the 
contribution to domestic growth, to sectors and 
markets, and the “cost of investments.” The treat-
ment of these issues was what the book was miss-
ing all along. The briefer “final reflections” sum up 
the role of foreign capital for the development of 
the Spanish economy. This was a topic of contro-
versy, in the 1970s, about the roots of Spain’s rela-
tive backwardness, in which some of the pioneers 
economic historians of Spain intervened. The book 
makes several timid references to this literature, 
but López-Morell is unfortunately not conclusive 
about it. 
Yet, the book will be valuable reading for 
those economic historians of Spain concerned 
with the public finances of the various political 
experiments of the century, the monetary conse-
quences of expansionary fiscal policies, the fiscal 
and financial impact of the Spanish American 
War, and the overall fiscal capacity of the Spanish 
modern state. Although the discussion of the eco-
nomic sectors in which Rothschild was invested 
is a bit too general, scholars will find a multitude 
of leads to explore further—particularly the rela-
tions of Catalonian and Basque vested interests 
with the protectionist efforts of the so-called 
nationalist governments of the 1920s. More 
general business and financial historians will be 
able to gather an immense amount of empirical 
details from this book. They should be intrigued 
by the house propensity to seek a monopolistic 
position in each of the ventures they pursued 
and the relative lack of adaptability when facing 
an adverse political climate or outright compe-
tition. López-Morell is admittedly ambiguous 
about how Rothschild organized and articulated 
their various investments (pp. 378–381). He has 
engaged little with other popular histories of the 
house, which probably appeared after the author 
did the original research; however, López-Morell 
could have served more from them to flag his own 
contribution and the differences of the Spanish 
branch of Rothschild for this English edition. 
Alejandra Irigoin
Economic History Department, 
London School of Economics
O Economic Development, 
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Of Medicines and Markets: Intellectual Property 
and Human Rights in the Free Trade Era. By 
Angelina Snodgrass Godoy. Stanford Studies in 
Human Rights. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013. Pp. xiv, 183. Paper. ISBN 978–
0–8047–8560–0, cloth; 978–0–8047–8561–7, 
pbk. JEL 2014–0669
Lawyers and economists have recently paid a 
great deal of attention to the globalization of intel-
lectual property rights. The 1994 Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, (the TRIPS agreement), established min-
imum standards for intellectual property pro-
tection in all member states of the World Trade 
Organization. 
Nations outside the OECD accepted the agree-
ment on the understanding that they would in 
turn receive improved access to OECD markets, 
especially in agriculture and textiles. They also 
recognized that failure of the agreement would 
expose dissenting nations to serious bilateral 
trade sanctions from the United States. In fact, 
the promised agricultural trade benefits have not 
been delivered. The post-TRIPS Doha meeting 
occurred at a time when an abortive lawsuit to 
prevent use of generics to fight AIDS in Africa 
was making international headlines, and was 
further complicated by the anthrax emergency 
in the United States, whose administration pres-
sured the maker of a key drug to make it acces-
sible on reasonable terms around the time when 
it was arguing against compulsory licensing at 
Doha. For the pharmaceutical industry, the Doha 
Declaration of 2001 ended less favorably than 
anticipated. It postponed compliance dates for 
low-income countries and allowed for some com-
pulsory licensing and national production and use 
of generics in emergency circumstances. 
Despite their presentation of TRIPS as an 
alternative to high-pressure bilateral confron-
tations, the European Union and the United 
States subsequently proceeded to pursue bilat-
eral “TRIPS+” agreements prescribing higher 
levels of protection of intellectual property than 
mandated in TRIPS, and in some cases higher 
than in force in either the United States or the 
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European Union. They began with small nations 
with little capacity (or in the puzzling case of the 
Australian Howard government, little inclination 
of the political leadership) to resist the pressure to 
accept stronger rules than mandated in TRIPS. 
So now many non-OECD nations are constrained 
not only by TRIPS, but also by subsequent bilat-
eral agreements, and multilateral agreements 
including importantly CAFTA. 
How have things turned out? In the near-
absence of solid empirical evidence, much of the 
legal and economic research has had to focus on 
the agreements as written, deducing their impli-
cations for accessibility and cost of medications 
and medical devices and services in nations that 
are not members of the OECD. The health effects 
for them appear, based on the documents them-
selves, to be overwhelmingly negative. Sanctions 
on trade in generic drugs limit the markets for 
a previously thriving generic pharmaceutical 
industry centered on India and foreclose access 
of other countries to imports of modern low-cost 
pharmaceuticals. There may be some improve-
ments in availability of new patented drugs in 
these countries, but at prices that can be afforded 
only by the relatively wealthy. International 
price discrimination is limited by the possibility 
of informal reexporting, and by existing “most 
favored nation” agreements with countries often 
already more favored in other ways. 
Of course, formal agreements are one thing, but 
implementation is quite another. Those opposed 
to TRIPS have had some reason to hope that inev-
itable discretion on implementation will mitigate 
its harsher distributional implications. Indeed, 
news reports suggest that Indian implementa-
tion is less effective than drug  manufacturers 
would like. Its economic power in general and 
its  expertise in pharmaceutical manufacture give 
it more latitude in translating the words of the 
agreement into reality for Indian society. Brazil 
has also had some success in pursuing its own 
interest despite the TRIPS agreement. 
There has been much less discussion of imple-
mentation in smaller nations. Godoy’s book 
shows that, in Central American nations, no news 
has not been good news with respect to access 
to pharmaceuticals on reasonable terms. Her 
focus is mainly on three nations: Costa Rica, 
with universal health care, El Salvador with a 
history of popular engagement on health issues, 
and Guatemala, with the largest economy of the 
three. All are included in the regional CAFTA 
agreement, which she characterizes, perhaps 
optimistically, as the “high water mark” of intel-
lectual property protection after TRIPS. 
Godoy’s serious empirical research for this book 
is backed by her earlier analyses of the implemen-
tation of CAFTA in all six CAFTA countries, and 
her prior role in the creation of Red CEPIAM, 
the Central American Network on Intellectual 
Property and Access to Medicines, which 
addressed the effects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IP) on the right to health, a common 
commitment in the three countries that are the 
focus of this book. For this book, she covered a 
lot of ground in each of the three. Her interviews 
include trade negotiators, pharma executives, 
public health advocates, physicians, patients, leg-
islators, health sector unions, human rights law-
yers, judges, state health officials, and IP officers. 
The results should be of interest to readers iden-
tifying with any of these groups, and to others 
working in economic development. 
After a nice introduction outlining the multi-
faceted issues she addresses and describing the 
evolution of her research strategies, in chapter 2 
she offers a readable primer on relevant intellec-
tual property issues. Chapter 3 is a gem, a font 
of valuable and eye-opening information on the 
implementation of IP and, in particular, CAFTA 
in the three countries. She reminds us that 
CAFTA adds tougher obligations than TRIPS 
and indeed goes beyond U.S. legislation in man-
dating five years of data protection to compensate 
for unreasonable delays. It burdens public health 
officials with obligations to enforce private IP 
rights and prosecute infringement with criminal 
as well as civil penalties. 
However some of Godoy’s toughest critiques 
are aimed at national health administrations, leg-
islators, and the courts. Guatemala, for example, 
granted fifteen years of retroactive data protec-
tion to me-too drug Nexium, and to the essential 
heat-stable AIDS drug Kaletra, unpatented in 
Guatemala. In 2009, ninety-eight drugs had test-
data exclusivity in Guatemala against nineteen in 
El Salvador and only five in Nicaragua. 
Chapter 4 enlightens the reader with the local 
politics of IP, pharmaceuticals, and health in 
1189Book Reviews
nations noted for a long-standing political com-
mitment to health rights. The survey yields fas-
cinating information on the ambivalent positions 
of generics producers. For example a Salvadorian 
generics producer and continental generics indus-
try leader, student of anti-IP academic Carlos 
Correa, privately accepts CAFTA. Indeed, sev-
eral industry leaders were right-wing ex-presi-
dents during the civil war; distrust of or animosity 
to leftist health rights advocates appears to trump 
immediate commercial interests. A more general 
key issue is lack of trust in public regulation of 
the purity and safety of drugs. This makes brand-
ing perhaps more important than IP. “Generics” 
are generally branded in Central America. In El 
Salvador, generic drugs were reportedly priced 
on average at thirty times their international 
reference prices. No wonder that there were no 
stable and effective coalitions between health 
advocates and generic producers during negotia-
tions of CAFTA.
Godoy moves in chapter 5 to a very distinct 
issue, patients’ rights litigation, focusing on in-
depth discussion of Guatemala based on her com-
pilation of decisions on 271 cases. Guatemala has 
constitutional guarantees of health rights, and 
the human rights ombudsman’s office litigates 
patients’ rights cases. The vast majority of ninety-
two cases on access to medicine were resolved 
in favor of the plaintiff. However, many cases 
granted the patient the right to use or keep using 
a branded version of a drug when a generic was 
available. Not surprisingly, pharmaceutical com-
panies facilitated appeals of this kind. Apparently 
the presence of the individual plaintiff (often 
middle class) was more persuasive to the judi-
ciary than the abstract interest of the nation in 
low cost health for all. 
Indeed, the book is strikingly effective in 
reframing well-worn policy controversies: “[F]ar 
from focusing excessively on state accountability, 
the global access movement targets major drug 
companies and the Northern Hemisphere gov-
ernments who do their bidding, while granting 
the states of Central America a free pass” (Godoy 
2013 p. 16.). And what is needed of the states in 
question? “Particularly as regards social and eco-
nomic rights, sometimes the challenge requires 
empowering a reticent state rather than retrain-
ing a repressive one” (Godoy 2013 p. 5).
Godoy turns in chapter 6 to a discussion of 
the evolution of global rights, including rights 
to health. The result is less satisfying. She offers 
an amalgam of informed empirical observations 
and what, to me, are unhelpful and unconvinc-
ing associations with political theorists of the left. 
When she locates the source of modern human 
rights organizations in the struggles with Latin 
American dictatorships, she misses the crucial 
role of European reactions to the trampling of 
rights in the Soviet Union. 
This highly informative book is pessimistic 
regarding the prospects for distributing the 
benefits of modern pharmaceuticals to needy 
populations in Central America. It is therefore a 
shock to find a table showing that nations in the 
region have all experienced remarkable gains 
in life expectancy and drops in child mortality 
between1990 and 2006. Is full access to modern 
drugs really so important to the continuation 
of the remarkable progress achieved in recent 
decades?
Brian Davern Wright
University of California, Berkeley
P Economic Systems
Mixed Fortunes: An Economic History of China, 
Russia, and the West. By Vladimir Popov. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014. Pp. ix, 191. $40.00. ISBN 978–0–19–
870363–1. JEL 2014–1434
In development economics, there are no three 
more important questions than (1) Why did the 
West get ahead of everybody else? (2) Why did 
Russia fail to catch up? and (3) Why is China 
succeeding now? Vladimir Popov endeavors, in 
his slender volume of fewer than 200 pages, to 
answer all three. There are very few economists 
as well placed to do so as Popov, currently at the 
United Nations, and previously a professor at 
the New School of Economics in Moscow and 
Carleton University, Ottawa, and lifelong student 
of China. Let me first give Popov’s answers to the 
three questions before I discuss them.
For Popov, development is escape from the 
Malthusian trap: higher overall income is not 
“dissipated” into population growth without 
increasing mean per capita income over the long 
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term. He dismisses popular explanations that 
see the forces behind the West’s breaking of the 
Malthusian trap in institutional change (Landes 
1998, Mokyr 2002) or “serendipity” of geographi-
cal and climatological accidents (Diamond 1997, 
Pomeranz 2000). He prefers an older explana-
tion, going back to Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi. 
In Popov’s view, the Malthusian trap is broken 
through “elimination of collectivist institutions 
[which gives] rise to increased inequality which 
in turn boost[s] savings and investments and the 
capital/labor ratio” (p. 20). The Western “big 
push” thus destroyed the “collectivist” institu-
tions and replaced them with individualistic 
profit-maximizing agents (English enclosures 
come to mind). It was a costly approach because 
it increased poverty and mortality, but it eventu-
ally worked. 
But why could not the same scenario be applied 
to the rest of the world? According to Popov, 
attempts at modernization, which were often 
done through colonization, failed because they 
broke indigenous institutions. This just increased 
poverty and inequality, but rather than leading 
to development, degenerated into a comprador 
capitalism (p. 52). In terms of prescriptions for 
long-term development, Popov, somewhat fatal-
istically, argues that “the Rest” should keep (or 
should have kept) its own “collectivistic” institu-
tions and waited until global (meaning Western) 
technological progress has advanced sufficiently 
so that it can break through the Malthusian trap 
by increasing productivity while avoiding greater 
inequality and poverty. 
On the second big topic (why did Russia fail?), 
Popov essentially repeats the argument that pre-
mature Westernization failed in Russia as it did 
elsewhere, because it destroyed autochthonous 
institutions (we are talking here of the Russia 
between Peter the Great and Pyotr Stolypin’s 
early twentieth century reforms) while the return 
to collectivist institutions under socialism failed 
because central planning could be successful 
only during the first investment “generation.” 
Afterwards, political incentives were such that 
planners preferred to invest in new plants rather 
than retool the old ones: that led to an excess of 
capital per worker, artificial shortages of labor, 
and low elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor, resulting in low growth.
And why did China succeed? Again, this fol-
lows directly from the answers to the first and 
second questions: Because it waited (obviously 
not consciously) to start modernization until the 
early twentieth century, and because it kept plan-
ning for thirty years only. Thus, China, largely 
accidentally, on both counts did exactly what 
was best: it did not start modernization too early 
and it jettisoned central planning just as it was 
becoming inefficient. 
Let me now review these main conclusions, 
which are here, of course, presented in their bare-
bones form. There is a lot of empirical evidence, 
discussion of the actual modernization episodes, 
and general nuance that cannot be covered in a 
short review. What I called a “fatalistic” approach 
to development, where a developing country 
instead of trying to catch up with the West would 
sit and wait until conditions became better is, in 
my opinion, neither feasible nor useful for poli-
cymakers. When Egypt began its modernization 
drive under Mohammed Ali or Madagascar under 
Radama I (both in the early nineteenth century), 
it could not have known what Popov today argues 
to be true. 
But perhaps the best rebuttal of the “do nothing 
until the time is right” hypothesis comes from the 
success of Japan; not the one after World War II, 
which Popov acknowledges, but the one between 
1850 and 1940. Japan modernized well, preserved 
most of its own institutions, generated investible 
surpluses, and basically played according to the 
Western textbook (as Morishima (1984) nicely 
documented in an old, but still relevant, book). 
I also believe that the same argument could be 
made for Russia: had it avoided the war and the 
Bolshevik Revolution, it is likely that its high 
rate of growth could have been maintained and 
 country fully modernized. So, early moderniza-
tion à la Occidentale was not necessarily doomed.
It is, however, also true that Russia, under col-
lectivistic socialism, experienced high growth and 
industrialization (which, as Popov writes, made 
it possible for the USSR to resist and ultimately 
defeat the second strongest industrial power at 
the time, Germany), but that effort eventually 
petered out. Popov’s rather technical explanation 
for the Soviet slowdown is not on the same level 
of abstraction as the rest of his thesis. I do not find 
it particularly convincing either. There is no rule, 
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I think, that would make planning efficient for 
thirty years only and never again. Rather I think 
that planning failed, not because of its intrinsi-
cally different efficiency in the 1930 versus the 
1970s, but because the nature of technological 
progress changed. To be ahead of the curve in 
the 1930s, you had to build dams, which central 
planning did pretty well; to be ahead of the curve 
in the 1970s, you had to build cars to please con-
sumers, which planning could not do.
This brings us to China, which Popov has exten-
sively studied, and with which he is as acquainted 
as with the Soviet Union/Russia where he lived 
and worked. I find compelling Popov’s argument 
that Mao’s policies set the necessary basis for 
China’s success: political independence from the 
West, higher education level (and not based on 
sterile rote Confucianism, but on more applied 
sciences), and longer life span of the population 
were all elements without which Deng’s reforms 
would not have succeeded. Deng simply built 
upon the (checkered) legacy left by his prede-
cessor. Many people are prone to forget the suc-
cess of China, as compared to India for example, 
even during the Maoist period—that is, success, 
despite the misnamed “Great Leap Forward” and 
Cultural Revolution. By 1976, Popov reminds us 
(p. 63), Chinese life expectancy was sixty-five 
years, thirteen years more than in India.
I would be remiss if I were not to mention an 
important and interesting innovation that Popov 
brings to the study of institutions. Instead of 
relying on subjective assessments of institutional 
strength (perception of corruption, rule of law), 
Popov proposes that we should look at two sim-
ple indicators: the murder rate and the size of 
the shadow economy. In well-ordered countries 
both are low; in weak institutional settings both 
are high. Their use makes sense too: high mur-
der rate directly challenges government monop-
oly on violence, high share of informal economy 
likewise challenges government monopoly on 
taxes. Both, therefore, show that institutions 
and enforcement are weak. Popov’s analysis is 
particularly convincing when he uses these two 
indicators to illustrate the dramatic institutional 
collapse that happened with the transition in 
Russia (an already high murder rate tripled), as 
well in England during the Industrial Revolution 
(the murder rate increased and life expectancy 
went down by five years over a century). China, 
on the other hand, scores much better on both, 
on par with the rich world, and on the murder 
rate better than the United States. As Popov 
mentions, in many respects China displays the 
features of a developed country, despite the fact 
that its income level is around one-third that of 
the developed West.
Popov’s book is short, but I think that it will 
have, per page, strong influence on how we look 
at economic development over the long term. 
Those who are interested in broadening their per-
spective and possibly challenging some of today’s 
tropes, especially regarding the importance of 
property rights and the role of Mao in China’s 
emergence, will find Popov’s book useful both in 
what they shall learn from it and even more in 
extending further some of the arguments, only 
sketched but not fully explored, by the author. 
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Most of this book is a blow-by-blow and quo-
tation-by-quotation account of the efforts in 
consecutive sessions of the U.S. Congress and 
congressmen and by successive presidents to 
deal with the public perception of continuing 
U.S. energy crises after 1973. Of course, there 
never were energy crises, apart from occasional 
and temporary oil price spikes and brief gaso-
line shortages. In particular, the embargo on 
oil exports to the United States by Arab OPEC 
members in 1973 had no effect in either 1973 
or early 1974, when the embargo was lifted. 
According to the statistics of the Energy 
Information Agency, oil imports rose mono-
tonically until 1978. Why then were there long 
lines at the gas stations? Simply because, want-
ing to keep their gas tanks close to full, drivers 
stayed in line in order to fill their tanks much 
more often than previously. This was no secret 
in 1973, though not generally recognized, even 
within the U.S. government.
The long lines at gasoline stations and occa-
sional price spikes burned a deep scar in the 
public memory. The apparent crisis symptoms, 
occasional spikes in gasoline prices, and the long 
lines were the source of persistent political efforts 
to, “do something.” The political debates were 
extensive and heated, and any number of pro-
posals were made and some were enacted. This 
reviewer has only a vague, newspaper-informed 
memory of the episodes and cannot give an opin-
ion as to whether the detailed accounts of the 
arguments are accurate. But Thomas Schelling, 
who is a careful professional, provides an approv-
ing back-of-the-book blurb, which gives me confi-
dence in the book’s story.
U.S. energy policy failed, as the book’s title 
proclaims, because the policy-making apparatus 
failed. The first task in making policy is, certainly, 
to identify the issues, which were market failures. 
That identification was never done clearly. The 
book characterizes the kinds of problems that 
lead to market failure: monopoly power, public 
goods, information asymmetries, search frictions, 
and unanticipated risk. All of these features, and, 
perhaps, more beside, exist in energy markets. 
By comparison, the policies offered to deal with 
the market failures were often simply to limit or 
direct demands through quotas and regulation 
of supply channels and, in some cases, uses, such 
as CAFE standards. There is a case for the latter 
because of the public good features of automobile 
and truck transport, but CAFE was intended as a 
demand limitation. There was never an attempt to 
reduce the riskiness in supply, which is inherent 
in oil markets. A comparison with banking regu-
lation illustrates the point. Banks are required to 
hold prescribed levels of reserves just because of 
potential volatility in their portfolios. Reduction 
in volatility of oil prices in some circumstances 
would have also benefited from larger petroleum 
stocks, but an efficient and equitable require-
ment, which would be difficult to design, was 
never considered.
The solutions offered to the nonexistent crises 
often only aggravated problems. It is striking that 
the politicians did not try to educate the public 
out of its perception of crises. Nor, by default, did 
the popular press succeed, perhaps for a lack of 
trying, in correcting the popular view. By com-
parison, there were certainly academic special-
ists who understood the energy situations clearly. 
They were either not consulted or not persuasive.
After the turn of the century, it has become 
clear that the world is floating on oil. Domestic 
oil production in the United States has reduced 
imports drastically and the United States would 
become an oil exporter if a blocking law were 
done away with. Oil from Kazakstan is held 
up only by some engineering problems with its 
pipeline. More oil will come from Iraq, if only 
its internal strife were alleviated. Reforms in 
Mexico are underway to increase its oil produc-
tion. Venezuela continues to be a question mark, 
but the world is doing well without its previous 
large exports. Demand continues to increase, but 
the Great Recession, which continues in Europe, 
has reduced it. China’s demand is expanding, but 
the rate of expansion is slowing with the rest of 
the economy and it is trying hard to expand its 
hydraulic fracturing potential.
In the 1990s, a real energy crisis did emerge, 
but the need to, “do something” has been much 
less unanimous than in the case of the phony 
energy crises. Still, the reality of global warm-
ing and the need to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions is starting to be more widely recognized. 
In order to reduce the emissions and resulting 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, 
it is necessary to reduce the burning of  fossil 
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fuels,  including oil. Yet, as the author makes 
clear,  policies to deal with this crisis have had less 
general support than was true of earlier energy 
policy and, in turn, are often inefficient and inef-
fective. Again, potential increases in the price of 
gasoline have been a scarecrow.
The economics in the book never tries to be 
above the level of Econ.100. The value of the 
book is in its detailed review of popular and leg-
islative history of attempts to formulate energy 
policy. So the book’s audience will not, primarily, 
be economists, but the students of political policy 
making. For them, it will be useful.
Richard S. Eckaus
Professor of Economics Emeritus, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Nature in the Balance: The Economics of 
Biodiversity. Edited by Dieter Helm and 
Cameron Hepburn. Oxford and New York: 
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Overall, this edited volume represents the 
very best compendium of current thinking on 
the economics of biodiversity. But it is a diffi-
cult book to summarize and evaluate. It consists 
of fifteen chapters of uneven quality (with fair 
overlap), written by more than forty authors and 
coauthors, totaling over 400 pages. The central 
theme is the economics of biodiversity, but the 
coverage spills over into neighboring subjects like 
ecosystem services, resilience, natural capital, 
national accounting, sustainability, preservation 
strategies, instruments and incentives, interna-
tional and developmental consequences, and so 
forth. While I personally consider the econom-
ics of biodiversity to be important, perhaps even 
very important (especially in the light of climate 
change), it is a frustratingly elusive subject. This 
volume itself reflects the immense diversity of the 
economics of biodiversity. The book is divided 
into five sections: Concepts and Measurement; 
Valuing Biodiversity; Natural Capital and 
Accounting; International and Development 
Aspects; and Policy Instruments and Incentives.
What is biodiversity? This is a critical open-
ing question. In its broadest terms, biodiversity 
(=biological diversity) refers to the variety or 
 variability of life on earth. But economics typi-
cally wants measurement. The leadoff chapter, 
written by scientist Georgina Mace, is entitled: 
“Biodiversity: Its Meanings, Roles, and Status.” 
This leadoff chapter is particularly clearly 
expressed. It is a great jumping-off first piece for 
anyone trying to learn about the subject. Mace 
skillfully elaborates that which we sort-of knew 
(and sort-of feared): the units of biodiversity are 
themselves many and varied, being highly depen-
dent on the observer and the context. She writes:
Different disciplines favour different mea-
sures of biodiversity. Ecologists tend to think 
about biodiversity in terms of the forms and 
functions of organisms in a place, especially 
in a community or an ecosystem, because it 
is the structuring of varieties in space and 
time that leads to functions and dynamics 
that they seek to understand. Evolutionary 
biologists similarly think about the dynam-
ics, but with an increasing focus on the his-
torical or inherited variation, and therefore 
the genetic and phylogenetic attributes. 
Conservation biologists are sometimes con-
cerned with function and process, as they 
should be, but often also with preservation of 
species or genetic diversity, seeking efficient 
and achievable solutions of the allocation of 
limited resources. For nature conservation-
ists and wildlife managers, biodiversity often 
simply means the maintenance of wild habi-
tats and species (p. 39).
Economists love to conceptualize problems 
in terms of optimizing an objective function 
subject to scarcity constraints. But as the above 
quotation makes clear, we are unable to clearly 
define an objective measure of biodiversity, or 
its value, upon which there is even rough agree-
ment. This is a core problem for the economics 
of  biodiversity. We must proceed as best we can 
with partial measures of the biodiversity we are 
seeking to preserve. Nothing in the book is able 
to satisfactorily get around this core dilemma. 
There is a further problem. “Biodiversity” and 
“ecosystem services” are often confounded as if 
they are the same thing. But they are not. One 
school of thought focuses on ecosystem services 
and emphasizes the extrinsic value to humans 
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of conserving ecosystems. A second school of 
thought is that conservation should be based on 
ethical arguments about the intrinsic value of 
nature, so that biodiversity should be conserved 
for its own sake. In an excellent chapter enti-
tled “Are Investments to Promote Biodiversity 
Conservation and Ecosystem Services Aligned?” 
authors Stephen Polasky et al. pose some opera-
tional questions about the two concepts and give 
some operational answers. Using data collected 
by the state of Minnesota, they measure ecosys-
tem services by carbon sequestration and water 
quality. They measure biodiversity by richness of 
vertebrate species. They find a high (but not per-
fect) degree of alignment between strategies that 
target the value of ecosystem services and those 
that target habitat for biodiversity conservation. I 
recommend this chapter highly, for its conceptual 
insights and its constructive empiricism.
Another chapter that demonstrates some con-
structive paths of analysis even when the objec-
tive of biodiversity or ecosystem services is 
incomplete or fuzzy is by Ian Bateman et al. enti-
tled “The UK National Ecosystem Assessment: 
Valuing Changes in Ecosystem Service.” The pri-
mary purpose of the UK NEA, which involved 
more than 600 scientists from a wide range of 
disciplines, was to assess the state of the United 
Kingdom’s ecosystems and the services provided 
by them as they have changed and will change 
over time. Six development scenarios are stud-
ied, which have varying degrees of environmen-
tal impacts. The chapter attempts to assess the 
impacts of the six development scenarios on such 
ecosystem services as food production, carbon 
storage, biodiversity (using birds as an indicator 
species), recreation, and urban greenspace. The 
quantification is rough, but, according to the 
authors, the analysis “sparked considerable inter-
est in the media and had a substantial impact on 
UK environmental policy” (p. 79).
Two chapters cover “Natural Capital” and 
“Biodiversity and National Accounting.” These 
chapters are instructive summaries of what is 
known and what has been done on an aggregate 
or national level. They offer useful insights, but 
the difficulties of actually adjusting real-world 
national income accounting to reflect biodiversity 
and sustainability represent formidable obstacles. 
This same problem of assessment haunts two 
other chapters devoted to the subject of valuing 
biodiversity more generally.
The chapter “Identifying and Mapping 
Biodiversity: Where Can We Damage?” by Kathy 
Willis et als. addresses the question of prioritizing 
the various unprotected landscapes in the world 
by ranking those that most need protection. I felt 
that the most useful part of this chapter consisted 
of a fairly comprehensive inventory of the data 
sets and tools currently available to assess world-
wide spatial patterns of biodiversity and ecosys-
tem services. The authors conclude that, while 
more data is desirable, a lot of usable data already 
exists, but it is not being used to its full potential.
The two chapters on international and devel-
opment aspects are interesting but a little vague. 
The four chapters on policy instruments and 
incentives are also interesting and perhaps a little 
less vague.
Anyone interested in the economics of biodi-
versity should turn first to this book. Its contri-
bution is to enumerate comprehensively all major 
aspects of current thinking on the economics of 
biodiversity. Its limitations are the inherent dif-
ficulty of the subject itself.
Martin L. Weitzman
Harvard University
Power to the People: Energy in Europe over 
the Last Five Centuries. By Astrid Kander, 
Paolo Malanima, and Paul Warde. Princeton 
Economic History of the Western World series. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2013. Pp. x, 457. $39.50. ISBN 978–0–
691–14362–0. JEL 2014–0708
Power to the People provides a rich account of 
Europe’s energy history. The depth and breadth 
of analysis enables the authors to cast new light 
on some central questions of economic history 
related to the Industrial Revolution. It also offers 
a wealth of new data about energy consumption in 
Western Europe over the last 200 years, which is 
available on the publisher’s website and (although 
lacking source information) will be a wonderful 
resource for research projects on the long-run rela-
tionship between energy and economic growth. 
For instance, the data shows that energy 
intensities in European countries differed 
greatly. England and Germany experienced 
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very high levels of energy use per unit of GDP 
as they industrialized heavily in the nine-
teenth century. Later industrialization in other 
European countries did not lead to such dra-
matic increases and some, such as Italy and 
Sweden, experienced only declines in energy 
intensity from the 1800s on. For early indus-
trializers, energy requirements were especially 
great. Iron production and, more generally, 
manufacturing, required vast amounts of heat 
and power for several reasons. They were not 
only manufacturing products for themselves, 
but also exporting. Also, they were using inef-
ficient technologies. Furthermore, they had 
access to large and cheap coal reserves, which, 
the authors argue, is one of the key factors in 
enabling the Industrial Revolution and allowing 
early industrialization. By the time the French, 
Italians, or Spaniards were industrializing on a 
large scale, they were able to adopt more effi-
cient technologies, their manufactured goods 
were not in great demand abroad, and they were 
more limited by domestic coal resources. Faced 
with such evidence, and mindful of the threat of 
climate change, one might draw partially opti-
mistic conclusions about energy intensity trajec-
tories in currently industrializing economies. 
No doubt responding to the threat, in the last 
six years, many notable books and journal articles 
have been published on the history and long-run 
developments in energy markets (e.g., Fouquet 
2008, Allen 2009, Ayres and Warr 2009, Wrigley 
2010, Smil 2010, Mitchell 2011, Grübler and 
Wilson 2014, and Jones 2014). Yet, to those in this 
field, the completion of Power to the People was 
greatly welcomed because the authors, Astrid 
Kander, Paul Warde, and Paolo Malanima, are 
leading scholars in the field of energy history and 
because of the ambition of their project—to bring 
together historical data on energy use in a host of 
European countries. 
When investigating the history of energy, a 
number of different perspectives can be taken: 
energy technologies, consumption, production 
and supply industries, political economy, the 
macroeconomic effects, the geopolitical impli-
cations, or the environmental impacts. Power to 
the People fits into the second of these strands, 
while offering insights for the grander history of 
three Industrial Revolutions. It brings together 
and synthesizes the evidence produced by a Tony 
Wrigley-inspired network of European economic 
historians focusing on energy. It covers, in three 
parts, the impressive growth in energy consump-
tion in Western Europe (a seven-fold increase in 
per capita consumption since 1800) and the spec-
tacular energy transitions (from biomass fuels to 
coal and to oil, natural gas, and electricity) that 
occurred since the First Industrial Revolution. 
Each part is written by one of the authors: 
Malanima studies the preindustrial period, 
Warde analyzes the First Industrial Revolution 
(1760–1830), Kander assesses the Second and 
Third Industrial Revolutions (post-1870). 
Malanima emphasizes the constraints of the 
mostly agrarian, “organic,” and renewable energy 
system, where land and climate as well as trans-
port costs, bound population and economic 
growth. He highlights how the Dutch and then 
the English managed to intensify their agricul-
ture, exploit power sources for milling and sea-far-
ing (and, thus, trade), and exploit new, more dense 
energy sources, particularly peat. Both Malanima 
and Warde propose that the development of coal 
resources and associated technologies was stimu-
lated by rising energy prices and efforts to save 
land and labor. Warde supports Allen’s (2009) 
argument that the concentration of coal reserves 
heavily influenced the geography of European 
industrialization, which has recently been corrob-
orated by the econometric analysis of Fernihough 
and O’Rourke (2014), who disentangle the direc-
tion of causality between energy and economic 
growth. However, Kander, Malanima, and Warde 
emphasize that the role of energy in economic 
growth probably changes at different levels of 
economic development, and may be waning in 
twenty-first century highly-developed economies.
Emerging as a recurring theme, Warde and 
Kander conceptualize energy systems as part of 
“development blocks,” in which the success of an 
energy source and its growth in use were closely 
linked to other technologies and industries. These 
energy systems (such as the coal block, consist-
ing of coal, steam engines, and the iron industry, 
later, the internal combustion engine-oil block, 
the electricity block, and, most recently, the ICT 
block) created mutual markets for each other’s 
products, achieving economies of scale and 
declining costs. They argue that the  implications 
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of energy  transitions depended on the market 
suction and market widening created by the 
links between, for example, oil demand and the 
car, and oil demand and oil tankers, respectively. 
As with their discussion on energy services, the 
authors do not use the key sources on the sub-
ject—here, particularly the coevolutionary ideas 
of Freeman and Louça (2001), and Geels and 
Schot (2007). This is unfortunate because it is an 
important reminder of the dynamic interdepen-
dence of resources, technologies, and industries, 
which economists too often ignore because of 
the difficulties of providing robust analysis. If a 
coherent economic theory could be developed, 
we might begin to build a bridge between past 
energy transitions, as discussed in this book, and, 
for example, encouraging possible future low-
carbon transitions. 
While the final, integrating chapter summa-
rizes key points in the book nicely, it does not 
lead to a new understanding of the long-run 
evolution of energy markets. Analyzing eight dif-
ferent countries over hundreds of years at three 
different phases of economic development was an 
opportunity to identify patterns and draw conclu-
sions, potentially of value for designing new theo-
ries of the relationship between energy use and 
economic growth, and for formulating policies 
related to future energy transitions and phases of 
economic development. Instead, it represents a 
generally well-crafted economic history, offering 
a great resource for economists to exploit and to 
draw new conclusions. 
With many insightful graphs, plus useful 
explanatory boxes for the less initiated, it is highly 
accessible, and recommended to undergraduate 
students curious about the history of energy, to 
postgraduates specializing in a specific field, and 
to academics. 
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